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MAC New Year Press Briefing Jan 22, 2010

  • The MAC will work hard to include cross-strait health and medical cooperation in the agenda of the sixth cross-strait talks
  • Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement is a chicken that will lay eggs
  • Discussions regarding the issue of avoidance of double taxation will focus on tax location principle
  • Government policy disallows citizens to hold political positions in the Mainland Area
  • The MAC hopes to create a mechanism to review the effectiveness and implementation of cross-strait SEF-ARATS agreements

MAC New Year Press Briefing

  Briefer : Lai Shin-Yuan, Minister; Johnnason Liu, Deputy Minister
Date : January 22, 2010
Time: 10:00 am
Location : 15th Floor, Audio-Visual Room


Remarks by Minister Lai (Pease see the attached file for details)


The MAC will work hard to include cross-strait health and medical cooperation in the agenda of the sixth cross-strait talks

QUESTION: Recently, mainland China’s Ministry of Health officials visited Taiwan with a view to promoting the signing of a Cross-Strait Health and Medical Cooperation Agreement during the fifth round of cross-strait talks. Is it possible to add this to the agenda for the fifth Chiang-Chen Talks? Also, it is reported that ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin said the fifth round of talks will take place in Shanghai and that there are some other people who hope the upcoming sixth talks will be held in Kaohsiung at the end of the year. Has the MAC been planning along these lines?


■ As to whether a Cross-Strait Health and Medical Cooperation Agreement will be added to the agenda of the cross-strait institutionalized negotiations, the MAC bases its opinion on the professional assessment of the Department of Health (DOH) and considers this an important issue and one that is beneficial to Taiwan. The MAC is more than ready to include this in the agenda of SEF-ARATS cross-strait institutionalized negotiations. With regard to which round of talks the said agreement would be added to, because the fourth round of the Chiang-Chen Talks confirmed the issues for the fifth round would be the ECFA (Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement) and IPR (Intellectual Property Rights), and in light of the DOH’s professional assessment, more time will be needed to complete relevant preparations. For these reasons, we will work hard to push forward with this and hope to include it in the sixth round of Chiang-Chen Talks.

■ On the venues for the Chiang-Chen Talks, because the next round of talks is so far in the future, the most important thing right now is negotiation preparations for substantive issues. It is still too early to talk about where this will all take place.

Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement is a chicken that will lay eggs

QUESTION: Would the Minister please talk a bit about the latest progress in negotiations on the cross-strait economic agreement and explain the reasons why negotiations may be delayed until the end of the month?

MINISTER LAI: The first formal negotiations on the Agreement have not been delayed at all. They can take place anytime from mid- to late January. The SEF and the ARATS will be getting in contact to determine the most convenient time for both sides. They are in continuing contact on this as we speak.

QUESTION: The Minister just said “signing the cross-strait economic agreement with mainland China represents only one link in Taiwan’s economy, not the entire economy.” But Taiwanese are quite hopeful that Taiwan can sign FTAs with South Korea, ASEAN and even other countries. I would like to ask the Minister what her expectations are in this regard. Can the government formally or informally exchange views on this issue with the Mainland, or even add it as a sub-issue to the negotiations on the economic agreement?


■ As to Taiwan’s signing of FTAs with neighboring countries, this is part of the trend in regional economic integration. Although in the past the DPP government worked hard to push this idea, Taiwan signed only FTAs with its five diplomatic allies that have very low trading volume with Taiwan. Right now we are consulting with the biggest export market—mainland China—on the signing of an economic agreement. This is a very big step. At the same time we also want to move forward with other countries in pursuing FTA negotiations. This is something we do on our own initiative and is an established government economic policy. We understand that arranging the signing of an economic agreement with mainland China will make neighboring countries more willing and more active in discussing an FTA with Taiwan.

■ The government will not talk with the Mainland about Taiwan’s discussions with other countries regarding the signing of FTAs. This is something different from a cross-strait economic agreement that moves on a different track.

QUESTION: In your remarks, you said “efforts at promoting the ECFA will draw the most attention, which makes it imperative to push forward Taiwan’s participation in regional integration.” Do you have any ideas on how to take part in regional integration? Can you elaborate a little more on that? Also, not long ago when you mentioned Taiwan’s negotiations on FTAs with other countries, you said these were quite another matter if compared to Taiwan’s signing of the ECFA with mainland China. In your estimate, will mainland China interfere in our talks on FTAs with other countries? What is your assessment of the China factor?


■ Economic and trade integration is extremely popular throughout the world. APEC is a good example of regional economic and trade integration. We have seen the WTO multi-round Doha negotiations that were supposed to be concluded within three years but have dragged on for nine years, and even now they are not yet finished. Because WTO has 153 members, it is rather difficult to talk about progress in multilateral free trade, so regional economic and trade integration is pursued throughout the world in various areas. When this trend is practiced everywhere, if a country like Taiwan, whose economic growth is chiefly driven by export trade, is not part of the trend, it will definitely be squeezed out and marginalized. As such, Taiwan’s export markets will shrink.

■ Once trade barriers form between economies, if Taiwan is not inside, it will be squeezed out. Beginning in 2003, mainland China has become our largest export market and trading partner. So, if we want to talk about economic agreements, we must certainly seek out the Mainland and talk with them first. This is the reason why we want to avail ourselves of the institutionalized negotiations to push ahead with a Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.

■ The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement does not, of course, represent the entirety of Taiwan’s economic industrial policies nor is it the only policy. We believe that discussions on FTAs with other neighboring countries are extremely important to our trade, so at the same time we also hope to work hard to discuss FTAs with them. This is something we do on our own initiative and something that is done for the sake of Taiwan’s economic and trade development. Furthermore, based on our experience in promoting institutionalized negotiations over the past 20 months, we do not believe the Mainland will interfere.

QUESTION: In yesterday’s Taipei Times interview President Ma clearly pointed to the ultimate goal of discussing the ECFA as leading both sides ultimately to set up a similar free trade zone. Could the Minister please tell us if the failure of both sides to sign an FTA and create a free trade zone is due to the fact that such an agreement is a diplomatic action that involves sovereignty? Also, with regard to FTAs with other countries, some people suggest that when the government discusses the signing of the ECFA with mainland China, it can demand that mainland China not obstruct Taiwan from signing FTAs with other countries. And you just said our government will move forward on a parallel track toward the goal of completing discussions on the signing of FTAs, but up to the present time, no corresponding measures have been proposed. If, at the very end, mainland China really does stand in the way, what in the world will we do?


■ Based on 20 months of experience of cross-strait institutionalized negotiations, I do not think the Mainland will interfere. It is the government’s policy that in promoting the ECFA, we will make simultaneous efforts to discuss FTAs with neighboring countries. However, such discussions are governed by many subjective and objective conditions. We have to see how desirous other countries actually are. This is a dynamic development process.

■ Right now our biggest export market is mainland China. As such, signing the ECFA is very important for Taiwan and beneficial for both sides. We think discussing the signing of this agreement will make other countries even more interested in discussing an FTA with Taiwan.

■ The ECFA is part of economic and trade activities between both sides of the Strait. Our discussions on the ECFA will certainly not involve political or sovereignty questions.

QUESTION: Why not directly sign an FTA with the Mainland?


■ FTA is a general designation everybody easily understands. There are more than 266 free trade agreements worldwide but each one has a slightly different name. Some FTAs signed between countries are also called “economic cooperation agreements.”

■ The word “framework” has been put in the government-promoted “Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.” The reason behind this is that if we follow the methods and procedures used by other countries in discussing FTAs, then, according to our evaluation, this will be unfavorable to Taiwan. This is because an FTA covers an extremely wide scope and the talks would be of long duration.

■ As of January 1, 2010, ASEAN plus One took effect and 90% of ASEAN products exported to the Mainland will be exempted from customs duties; and Korea and Japan are actively discussing an FTA with the Mainland, which might be concluded in the next several years. As a responsible government, we naturally want to take precautions and plan ahead for the sake of Taiwan’s economic and trade market.

■ We first talk and come up with a framework-type agreement, and then undergird this with a more important item—this is the “early harvest list.” Our goal is to get this done during this year’s fifth Chiang-Chen Talks. After this goes into effect we can reduce or eliminate tariffs for certain products, thus making our exports to mainland Chinese market more competitive. At this stage, we are talking about what is for us top priority, most urgent and most necessary. This is the correct strategy.

QUESTION: When Minister Lai reported to Legislative Yuan President Wang Jin-pyng, you mentioned that six negotiation teams would be set up for the ECFA negotiations. Can you talk about the contents or orientation of the “early harvest list”?


■ Our explanation to Legislative Yuan President Wang Jin-pyng a few days ago was just by way of illustration. Whether there will be six negotiation teams has not yet been determined. The first round of formal negotiations to be held in late January will discuss the overall and procedural issues concerning the agreement. How the substantive negotiations over the next several months will be arranged will then be determined by both sides.

■ As for the “early harvest list,” because substantive talks have not yet begun, the list has not yet emerged. Basically, the list is definitely being pursued in a direction most favorable for our exports. When it comes to the assessment of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, it is certain that the thinking on this list is oriented toward optimizing our industrial competitiveness and maximizing the level of exports.

QUESTION: Minister Lai just said she does not think the Mainland will interfere with Taiwan’s discussions with other countries about FTAs. What facts is this confidence based on?


■ The ROC government has been spending a great deal of effort in discussing the signing of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement with the Mainland since last spring. While we have been actively promoting this idea and plan, many questions have arisen about our signing of FTAs with other countries. The government has clearly stated that it would handle agreements of these two kinds in parallel.

■ We believe that the Mainland has not only heard about the message that Taiwan hoped to discuss with neighboring countries about FTAs, but it has also had an understanding in this regard. Since last year when we promoted the signing of a cross-strait economic agreement, we have never received any message indicating that the Mainland would interfere.

QUESTION: Legislative Yuan President Wang has previously said in numerous media interviews that twelve agreements were sent to the Legislative Yuan and then, because of clauses that stipulated they automatically go into effect after one month’s time, it was impossible for the Legislative Yuan to conduct a substantive review. In a Reuters interview President Wang also mentioned that he hoped to talk over and discuss this question with the executive branch. Is the MAC thinking about amending the law and accepting substantive supervision by the legislature? President Wang also touched on so-called “substantive supervision,” by which he meant that if the Legislative Yuan voted against the ECFA, it should be renegotiated by the executive branch and then sent once again to the Legislative Yuan for deliberation. Do you think this is a variable in whether or not the ECFA will take effect?


■ First of all, the government should certainly act in accordance with the law. According to current law, i.e., Article 5 of the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, which has undergone a major revision in 2003 during the period of the DPP administration, if a cross-strait agreement requires any amendment to laws, it shall be sent to the Legislative Yuan for approval. If it does not require any amendment to laws, it shall be sent to the Legislative Yuan for recordation. When it comes to the 12 agreements signed in the past, executive agencies had submitted these agreements to the Legislative Yuan for approval or recordation in accordance with the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area passed by the Legislative Yuan. There was absolutely no violation of legislative supervision.

■ After these 12 agreements were in the process of legislative review, if legislators insist that these agreements should be sent for “approval” rather than for “recordation,” since this falls within their duties and responsibilities, executive agencies will show respect. In line with the separation of powers between the executive and the legislative branches in the Republic of China, if these 12 agreements had only to be sent for recordation, and as long as the recordation process was sound and complete, the executive branch could then implement them. This is what it means to administer by law and is far from being a case of automatically taking effect as claimed by some outsiders.

■ These 12 cross-strait agreements absolutely did not contain the word “automatically” as in “automatically” take effect. If in the future the Legislative Yuan wants to amend the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area or change the way things have been done in the past, the Executive Yuan will naturally respect any relevant resolutions as long as they have been passed by the Legislative Yuan. The current Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area is very clear on all this: that which should be under the authority of the executive is under the authority of the executive, that which should be under the authority of the legislature is under the authority of the legislature. We think for now the law of this kind is quite sufficient, quite adequate for handling or overseeing a bilateral agreement to be signed.

QUESTION: The other day after paying an official call on Wang Yi, a Taiwanese legislator misquoted him as saying, “if Taiwan can sign FTAs with other countries, this would be beneficial for everyone.” Mainland China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) then issued a public denial, saying Wang Yi had not said anything like that. According to what you previously said, Taiwan has not received any message from the Mainland that it would stand in the way of Taiwan’s signing of FTAs with other countries, so do you consider the TAO’s denial action in this case a polite rebuff of this position? How do you interpret the TAO’s response?

MINISTER LAI: These two issues have no logical connection. The media right now are concerned about whether the MAC thinks the Mainland will interfere or step in to prevent Taiwan from signing FTAs with other countries. We want to emphasize that whether we will sign FTAs with other countries is an action we take on our own initiative, we don’t need the consent of others to do it. In the second place, during the process of promoting the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Agreement since last spring, we have never gotten the feeling, and do not think, that the Mainland will interfere in our signing FTAs with other countries.

QUESTION: Just now Minister Lai said she does not think mainland China will interfere in Taiwan’s signing of the FTAs with other countries. Can she cite some concrete evidence for this? If mainland China really will not interfere, is there a possibility of finding a country to sign an FTA with Taiwan and then see what happens? Also, Chen Po-chih wonders whether during the signing process, there is a possibility that when the FTAs that Taiwan signs with the US, Japan or other countries take effect, the ECFA will take effect at the same time with them.


■ This morning I read a news story by United Daily News reporter Lee Chih Te and what the Liberty Times said about the remarks by Professor Chen Po-chih of the Taiwan Thinktank. Professor Chen likened the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) to a bad egg. This metaphor is completely wrong.

■ We want to emphasize that the ECFA is a chicken that can lay eggs, not a bad egg that Professor Chen claims it is. It will give us a great many eggs beneficial to our economy. Our government’s good economic policy is, in fact, made up of chickens that know how to lay eggs, and the ECFA is one of them. I’d like to use this press conference today to explain this point to the public.

■ I think what you just quoted was not talking about economics from a purely economic perspective. For example, you said Professor Chen Po-chih mentioned whether or not we could first find another country to sign an FTA with us and then wait and see, and if we first sign an FTA with another country, well, we can then sign the ECFA with the Mainland. This implies that Professor Chen also thought it’s right to sign the ECFA, but he insisted that it should be signed after we have signed FTAs with other countries.

■ We want to emphasize that when it comes to talking about economics from a purely economic perspective, the ECFA is a purely economic agreement. People around the world who understand free trade agreements know this. The most important thing is to go and talk with your biggest trade and export partner, and make a special point to include a geographical consideration.

■ When the DPP was in power, Taiwan signed five FTAs with our five diplomatic partner countries but all were located in Central America. Firstly, they are geographically very far away; secondly, trading volumes are extremely low. So, although there was an increase in trade after we signed the FTAs (for example, Nicaragua shipped more coffee to Taiwan and we shipped more goods to Nicaragua), trade with these countries remained very small as a proportion of Taiwan’s trade.

■ Trade experts from all over the world as well as theory know you have to go out and talk with countries that are intimately bound up with you in terms of geography and the nature of their trade relationship. This is why we think it is most critical to first engage in talks with the Mainland regarding the ECFA. Since it is the most critical thing, and since timing is another consideration, we hope to first secure Taiwan’s export competitiveness. So why shouldn’t we first actively work for the signing of the ECFA?

■ The MOEA has been actively discussing the signing of FTAs with other countries since 2000, and government policy has been moving on parallel tracks. Which track is moving more quickly or more slowly depends on the actual situation. We don’t use politics to decide that you first go ahead and sign an FTA with some another country and then you sign an ECFA with the Mainland. This doesn’t make any sense, because judging from the entire economy and export trade market, it makes no sense. No one should look at the situation from a political, ideological or non-economic perspective. Rather, they should look at it from an economic angle by dealing with this issue strictly on its own merits. If we look at it from the economic angle, there are many areas than can be discussed and debated—how do we get a good grip on a strategy that has the maximum benefit for Taiwan, how do we prevent damage to Taiwan industry that is chiefly focused on internal demand—this is what defines smart negotiations.

■ The government has repeatedly announced it will not permit the enlarged import of over 800 agricultural products, and Mainland laborers will certainly not be allowed in. On this we will certainly do as we say. On an additional 1,300 agricultural items that were already on the open list during the eight-year period of the DPP administration or earlier, we will do all we can so that tariffs on these items will not continue to decrease. This is what negotiations are all about. We insist on the best for ourselves and hope to effectively protect our own domestic market.

■ In sum, in line with the relevant plans of the various departments of the Council for Economic Planning and Development, if in the future industries need a period of adjustment or need government guidance to allow them to undergo transformation or raise competitiveness, or allow them to move ahead and not just be satisfied with domestic market demands—this can mean exports to the Mainland or other markets, then all of this can be achieved via economic means, tools and guidance. This is the task the government works hard to accomplish for industries and for the people.

Discussions regarding the issue of avoidance of double taxation will focus on tax location principle

QUESTION: During the fourth Chiang-Chen Talks the issue of avoiding double taxation hit a brick wall and discussion ended. When will negotiations on this start up again? Mainland China chiefly uses the principle of “place of origin” and in our Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area “place of origin” is also mentioned as a taxing principle. Why have we proposed “place of residence” as a taxing principle in negotiations? Hong Kong also recently released a statement that they intended to sign a double taxation avoidance agreement with Taiwan. What is our side’s position on this?


■ Because of a certain number of technical questions and the fact that we thought we had not yet gotten the best terms, both sides decided to delay the signing of an agreement on the avoidance of mutual taxation that was under discussion at the fourth Chiang-Chen Talks.

■ Between now and when the fifth Chiang-Chen Talks take place, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) will continue consultations with the relevant agencies of the Mainland side. As to whether “place of origin” or “place of residence” is to be used as the taxing principle, both sides more or less reached a consensus while negotiating the Cross-Strait Tax Agreement. In continuing future discussions, the above-mentioned technical questions should be the primary focus.

■ We have all along been discussing taxes and levies with Hong Kong. In this regard, we respect the views of the competent tax authority. If the competent tax authority believes that its considerations concerning the entire tax system are appropriate, then in the future we will not rule out the possibility of discussing related matters in that direction.

Government policy disallows citizens to hold political positions in the Mainland Area

QUESTION: Minister Lai has said that the MAC plays the role of “door-god” for cross-strait relations. We know the door-god has two functions: 1) fend off the enemy, and 2) guard against enemy agents. Recently, there was a news report that six Taiwanese businessmen became committee members of the Chongqing Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). If this trend continues, the number of CPPCC members from Taiwan will outnumber Taiwan legislators. I’d like to ask, how will the MAC deal with this behavior that so brazenly challenges cross-strait relations? There is also a case involving Ms. Sally Wu who occupies a position as a member of mainland China’s CPPCC. Recently, she returned to Taiwan and shared the stage with the President. The President made his remarks and then left. Subsequently, Ms. Wu chaired the forum discussions. I’d like to know how the MAC will deal with Ms. Wu’s case?


■ As for the just mentioned door-god, it has been regarded as the God of Protection in local temples. As such, we think that in promoting cross-strait relations and mainland China policy, the government should be animated by a bold and active spirit and attitude—this is “opening the door.” But during the process of promoting this agenda, “keeping watch at home” is of equal importance. This means we should have accompanying measures and a concept of risk. For the sake of the people, we will definitely guard well the interests of Taiwan. In this way we promote a policy and guard Taiwan’s interests at the same time. We think using the image of the door-god is the best way to have people at the grassroots level more easily understand what is going on. This is our main intention. We have been promoting this idea for more than a year. It has been disseminated everywhere at every level of society, has been seen, heard and affirmed.


■ With regard to the case involving Ms. Sally Wu, my remarks have two parts. Firstly, although she is a longtime resident of Hong Kong, she remains an ROC citizen. Her right to return to Taiwan is guaranteed in the Constitution as it is for all Taiwanese. When it comes to her return to Taiwan from Hong Kong to engage in professional journalistic activities, there are no legal restraints, based either on the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area or any other domestic law, to which we would have recourse.

■ As for her residency in Hong Kong for many years and having the status of a member of mainland China’s CPPCC, as stipulated under the current Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, this is outside the scope of things permitted. We are now handling relevant cases in conjunction with departments from other government agencies.

■ It was just mentioned that some Taiwan businessmen or presidents of the Taiwan businessmen’s associations have been invited to participate as CPPCC members, or that some Xiamen Taiwan businessmen have attended the National People’s Congress (NPC) as non-voting members. We will ask the SEF to make contact and get further understanding of this. Some chairmen of Xiamen Taiwan businessmen’s associations explain that they are officially invited by the NPC Standing Committee, but the invitation status is as non-voting members representing the Taiwan businessmen’s associations, so throughout the NPC they have no other NPC status or qualification that any NPC representative should have, and they do not take the floor.

■ We reiterate once again. In accordance with Article 33 of the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, we do not agree that our citizens occupy any political position in the Mainland Area. This is the government’s policy. As for individual cases, government agencies will expedite their handling in conjunction with related departments.

The MAC hopes to create a mechanism to review the effectiveness and implementation of cross-strait SEF-ARATS agreements

QUESTION: After the Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement was signed last year, all we see today are a few cases of telecom fraud that have been successfully prosecuted. Prosecutions of fugitives on the most-wanted list and the repatriation of Taiwanese prisoners have not been so conspicuous. What does the Minister think of this level of administrative efficiency on the part of mainland China?


■ As for individual cases, we regret but at the same time hope that via the mechanisms set up by the Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement, we can immediately and effectively handle these cases. We hope to create a review mechanism to help bring these cases to fruition via the cross-strait, SEF-ARATS institutionalized negotiations.

■ The MOJ is Taiwan’s main liaison window responsible for dealing with the Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement, while mainland China has four liaison windows. The MAC will again express its opinions to the MOJ and hope that they can strengthen this part as soon as possible.


■ When we were devising the Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement, the focus was the hope that if ROC citizens became involved in cross-strait criminal situations, their rights and interests would receive maximum protection, thus the focus was not just emphasizing the implementation of follow-up actions like assistance in arrest and repatriation or litigation.

■ The focus of the Agreement centered on three areas: First, judicial documents should be served in a legal fashion so that there would be transparency in the process and a guarantee of procedural justice as the legal case advanced. Second, investigation and the presentation of evidence. Because cases involve truth or the lack of it, as well as the commission of a crime or not, each side in the process should have adequate access to the other side’s evidence. This is aimed at allowing a final decision to be made via a fair trial. The third area of emphasis was assistance in arrest and repatriation.

■ Our liaison window has been set up in the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). The other side has set up four liaison windows. As of the end of 2009, there were more than 3,000 mutual requests. Thus the liaison windows for both sides are under a great deal of pressure. As Minister Lai just noted, the mechanism was designed with the hope that cases could be handled with assistance quickly and effectively. This is a target that the MOJ should abide by as they function as a liaison window. The MAC also hopes to spur on improvement through the use of a future review mechanism.

■ As for individual cases, the first case following the signing of the Agreement was that of Lin Chu-tan. After the signing of the Agreement, the MOJ made a request based on it and on September 24, 2009, brought the issue up again. Originally the litigant’s family members requested in March, 2009 that he be placed on medical parole and released back to Taiwan, but because at the time there was no assistance mechanism, the ARATS responded in March of the same year stating this was not inconsistent with regulations. Now since we have a mechanism, we hope we can improve the system as soon as possible. The MOJ has already exchanged views on this face to face with the Mainland side. I think the MOJ can speed up the follow-up process via this face-to-face communication. But because this is a new mechanism, it involves how the bilateral judicial process works together, including numerous standards and document formats. I think the MOJ will proceed with follow-up implementation procedures in this regard as soon as possible.