Mingtong Chen
Chairman of Mainland Affairs Council
Friends from the Media and ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon!
I welcome all of you to visit us, it is an honor and privilege to hold this
press conference and give a short briefing entitled The DPP Administrations
Logic and Policy on China. I will take this opportunity to share with you the
essence of our cross-strait policy and the current state of cross-strait
relations.
1. Preface
The DPP administrations China policy has long been criticized as
inconsistent. In fact, the partys China policy has focused on several clear
strategic objectives, and its plans for achieving these objectives are
meticulous, logical, cautious, and consistent. Where there are changes, they are
strategic adjustments in accordance with the external environment, and they do
not reflect inconsistency as criticized.
Simply speaking, the DPP administrations strategic goal in cross-strait
relations is to normalize relations. The key concepts in the current phase of
relations are peaceful development, equality, mutual benefits, and mutual trust.
The guiding principles in reaching these goals are goodwill, reconciliation,
active cooperation, and permanent peace. The party has designed the following
policies to achieve those goals:
1. To reach a consensus on national identity: Taiwan is an independent
sovereign nation, and its name is the Republic of China, as stipulated in the
Constitution.
2. To promote a future of co-existence and co-prosperity: taking the
integration model of the European Union as a reference when designing the future
structure of cross-strait affairs.
3. To make interim arrangements for such a future: moving from economic and
cultural integration to a new framework for political integration, including:
(1)Negotiating a cross-strait framework of interaction for peace and
stability (also referred to as a peace and stability framework for
interaction): mutually assuring that there are no unilateral changes to the
status quo in the Taiwan Strait;
(2)Developing cooperative economic relations: from proactive liberalization
with effective management to proactive management with effective
liberalization; and
(3)Facilitating the democratization of the PRC government: dissolving
fundamental cross-strait conflicts.
2. The Strategic Objective: the Normalization of Cross-Strait Relations
The normal cross-strait relations that we expect echo the goals that the DPP
proclaimed in the 1999 Resolution Regarding Taiwans Future. The normalization
of cross-strait relations is based on the historical fact and current reality
that Taiwan is sovereign and independent, that it is called the Republic of
China according to the current constitution, and that neither Taiwan nor the PRC
belongs to the other. As people around the world call for reconciliation,
stability, and prosperity, Taiwan and China cannot alienate themselves from such
global trends. Two countries that share geographic proximity, economic benefits,
and cultural origins cannot remain in a state of hostility and mutual isolation.
Taiwan and China should abandon their suspicion and antagonism. Based on Taiwan
and Chinas long-lasting historical, cultural, and ethnic ties, the two should
hold on to their mutual benefits rather than discrimination, peace rather than
conflict, and equality rather than a hierarchical relationship. The two should
carefully manage geopolitics, regional stability, and their economic interests;
both sides should work together toward a future of co-existence, co-prosperity,
mutual trust, and mutual benefit. This is the bright future of the cross-strait
that members of the DPP have resolved to pursue, the commitment the party has
made to the world, and the goal of normalization of cross-strait relations that
the government has furthered since gaining the support of the people and
becoming the ruling party.
3. Strategic Principles: Goodwill, Reconciliation, Active Cooperation, and
Permanent Peace
Once we have a strategic objective, we must have clear strategic principles
in order to achieve that objective. The strategic principles established by
President Chen are goodwill, reconciliation, active cooperation, and permanent
peace.
These strategic principles were chosen with a particular focus on Taiwan and
Chinas opinions on the issue of sovereignty, as well as each countrys beliefs
about the others political status. Although there exists a difference of
opinion that is difficult to reconcile at present, it is a fact that has
resulted from years of historical developments. The government and leaders of
each side should neither unilaterally deny the others sovereignty nor force the
other to accept its definition of sovereignty. Since Taiwan began allowing its
citizens to visit relatives in China in 1987, and since it later began allowing
Taiwanese businessmen to travel to China to invest and conduct business,
exchange between the people of both sides has grown in leaps and bounds, and
trade relations have developed tremendously. Such positive exchanges in the
economic and social realms are in fact helpful in mending the political gap.
Exchange helps to enhance mutual understanding and cultivate the goodwill
necessary for political reconciliation. Exchange advances and promotes active
cooperation across the Strait, and hopefully it can bring permanent peace as
well. When that time comes, the goal of normalizing cross-strait relations will
naturally follow. For this reason, goodwill, reconciliation, active cooperation,
and permanent peace are the strategic principles for the normalization of
cross-strait relations.
4. Policies for Achieving the Strategic Objective
Proactive policies are necessary in order to achieve the strategic objective
of normalizing cross-strait relations. The DPP administration has adopted three
such primary policies: building a consensus on national identity, proposing a
future of co-existence and co-prosperity, and making arrangements to move in the
direction of such a future. Since 2000, the DPP administration has derived its
China policies primarily from the three policies listed above. The content of
these policies is described below:
Building a Consensus on National Identity
For more than a decade, Taiwans democratization has stimulated the peoples
sense of identity, broken the illusory national identity of Great China
established by the authoritarian leaders of the past, and has gradually built a
new consensus on national identity. Through the efforts of the DPP
administration over the past several years, a national identity that centers on
Taiwan has gradually taken root. In the past, under the leadership of political
strongmen, Taiwans national identity was fraught with illusions and was very
different from the current reality. Now that two of those strongmen passed away
one after another, this illusory national identity has faded. The
democratization that ensued has caused the rise of a Taiwanese consciousness,
and a new national identity, distinct from that of the past, has emerged.
According to long-term studies of the experience of national identity
transformation, only 41 percent of those surveyed in 1996 considered Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu as part of the nations territory, while 42 percent
believed that the mainland should also be included. In 1998, however, these
percentages rose to 65 and dropped to 27, respectively. After the DPP became the
ruling party in 2000, a September 2003 survey showed that the former percentage
increased to 71.1, while the latter dropped to 13.5.
Similarly, 44 percent of those surveyed in 1996 believed that only the 21
million people in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu were their compatriots, while
39 percent believed that the 1.2 billion people of China should be included as
well. In 1998, the former percentage rose to 64, while the latter decreased to
28. In a survey conducted in September 2003, the former increased to 77.2, while
the latter dropped to 10.6.
China has been unwilling to face the awakening of Taiwanese consciousness and
the new national identity that has developed thereof. China continues to
criticize the new national identity as Taiwan independence or creeping Taiwan
independence, using such language as anti-Chinese and forgetful of ones own
origins. The DPP made it clear in the Resolution Regarding Taiwans Future
that the party is willing to follow the current constitution and accept the
Republic of China as the countrys name, and President Chen made the Four Noes
and One Without pledge in his inaugural address in 2000. Even so, Beijing still
considers these actions to be a veil for Taiwan independence and insists that
Taiwan accept the one China principle, which, in Beijings definition, is that
there is only one China, Taiwan is a part of China, and the PRC is the sole
legal government of China. Only when Taiwan accepts this definition will any
further developments in cross-strait relations be made. Today, Taiwans
governmental agencies propose various cross-strait policies based on a spirit of
goodwill, reconciliation, active cooperation, and permanent peace. However,
these policies have been either resisted or simply ignored by Beijing.
In an interview with the Washington Post, President Chen pointed out that
China does not recognize the existence of the ROC, but it is not willing to see
the name clarified or changed, either. Without a doubt, this presents a dilemma.
This is a matter that the Beijing authorities need to consider seriously. If the
Taiwan independence that Beijing refers to is a change in the status quo,
Beijing should admit that the status quo, which includes the ROC government, is
not Taiwan independence. Beijing should further respect what President Chen said
in his Cross-Century Remarks:
we would like to appeal to the government and
leaders on the Chinese mainland to respect the existence and international
dignity of the Republic of China; publicly renounce the use of force
. If China
cannot do this, there is no difference in the eyes of the twenty-three million
people of Taiwan between Beijing denying the ROC and Beijing denying Taiwan
independence. It would also be unnecessary for the Taiwanese to uphold the ROC.
Proposing a Future of Co-Existence and Co-Prosperity
Simply speaking, before the DPP became the ruling party, it had already set a
goal to co-exist and co-prosper with China. That goal is established on the
basis of safeguarding the integrity of Taiwans sovereignty, in the hope of
ending the confrontation between both sides and normalizing relations.
Therefore, once the DPP won the opportunity to be the ruling party, President
Chen promptly stated in his 2000 inaugural address that:
Today, as the Cold War has ended, it is time for the two sides to cast aside
the hostilities left from the old era
. The people across the Taiwan Strait
share the same ancestral, cultural, and historical background. While upholding
the principles of democracy and parity, building upon the existing foundations,
and constructing conditions for cooperation through goodwill, we believe that
the leaders on both sides possess enough wisdom and creativity to jointly deal
with the question of a future one China.
But what is the future one China? What form would it take? How can we
ensure Taiwans sovereignty and status under this model? President Chen further
elaborated on this point in his Cross-Century Remarks in late 2000. In that
remark, President Chen for the first time proposed a new framework for political
integration, the well-known Integration Theory. The purpose of the new framework
for political integration is to pursue co-existence and co-prosperity for Taiwan
and China with the prerequisite that the government and leaders of the PRC must
respect the space for existence and the dignity of the ROC in the international
community, as well as publicly abandon the use of force. It is obvious that the
political integration of the ROC (or Taiwan) and the PRC is a multi-sovereign
associated system, which is different from the mono-sovereign system that the
KMT and the CCP sought in the past. The past fifty years, however, have proven
the mono-sovereign system (or unification) that the KMT and CCP sought to be
unfeasible. In addition, this system does not suit the current interests of the
Taiwanese people. A political stalemate existed for fifty years under KMT rule,
and the tense political relations were never relaxed. Now that the DPP is the
ruling party, the new government can adopt a new way of thinking. It was in this
spirit that President Chen appealed to the PRC to demonstrate great tolerance
and progressive thinking and search for a new framework for political
integration in order to overcome the current confrontation and stalemate.
Political integration originates from the idea of a multi-sovereign system
and includes all possible models ranging from the loosest, a commonwealth, to
the more closely integrated European Union or confederation model. In his
inaugural address in 2004, reflecting on the recent integration of the EU,
President Chen encouraged all elements of society, and even the PRC leaders, not
to rule out the integration model of the EU as a new paradigm for future
cross-strait relations. Nevertheless, President Chen and the DPP administration
maintain an open mind on whether Taiwan and the PRC should adopt a more
traditional model of integration, such as a confederation; the EU model; or a
commonwealth, or develop a new model of integration. Ultimately, however, any
model of integration adopted by both sides must have the approval of the
twenty-three million people of Taiwan.
Making Interim Arrangements for the Future
Seeking a political integration model of co-existence and co-prosperity is
one of the focuses of the DPPs China policy. Achieving this goal, however, is
easier said than done; it requires a long process. Take the EU model that
President Chen mentioned, for example. It began in 1951 when Germany and France
signed the Treaty of Paris to establish the European Coal and Steel Community.
Over forty years had passed when the Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992,
establishing the EU. The most important reason for the EUs success is that
member states share common ground in their political systems (democracy),
economies (capitalism), societies (free and liberal), legal systems (rule of
law), and universal values (human rights). Unfortunately, there are large
discrepancies in these areas across the Taiwan Strait, even opposition and
conflict. Even though China gave up its communist command economy in 1978 and
adopted socialist market economy reforms, approaching a capitalist system, the
reality in China is still quite different from the political, social, and legal
systems, as well as universal values, that Taiwan has adopted. For this reason,
Taiwan and the PRC still have a long way to go if they expect to realize the EU
model of integration. This matches President Chens point in his Cross-Century
Remarks: in order to seek a new framework for permanent peace and political
integration across the Strait, both sides must start from economic and cultural
integration and then gradually cultivate mutual trust.
It will take a long time for Taiwan and the PRC to create a new framework for
political integration that can provide co-existence and co-prosperity, and at
the moment, opposition and conflict have rendered cross-strait relations quite
unstable. In order to stabilize cross-strait relations, both sides must sign an
agreement on an interim framework that does not decide an ultimate political
arrangement. Only in this way can both sides expand cross-strait exchanges and
create an environment for economic and cultural integration. The DPP considered
this issue in its 1999 Resolution Regarding Taiwans Future. The seventh
proclamation stated that Taiwan and China should engage in comprehensive
dialogue to seek mutual understanding and economic cooperation, and that both
sides should build a framework for long-term stability and peace. In other
words, to move towards a new framework of political integration, it would not be
sufficient merely to start from economic and cultural integration; there must be
a full set of interim arrangements in order to bridge the gap between the two
sides of the Strait. The content of such arrangements is threefold: (1) to
negotiate framework of interaction for cross-strait peace and stability; (2) to
develop economic cooperation; and (3) to assist democratization in the PRC and
thoroughly resolve the basic contradictions between both sides. Further
explanations please refer to my book from page 111 to page 130.
5. Conclusion
Although Beijing has challenged the DPP administrations China policy a
countless number of times, the above analysis shows that President Chen has held
on to the normalization of cross-strait relations as a consistent objective. He
has not only held on to clarity in his strategy and principles, but has also
enacted a series of policies designed to achieve this objective. Judging from
the past several years of his administration, President Chen will continue to
strive for this goal. In looking ahead to the future of cross-strait relations,
the world can be cautiously optimistic. The reason for this optimism is that
peaceful development is a goal shared by both China and Taiwan, and it is in
fact the greatest common denominator between them. We can make a bold leap of
faith in assuming that the leaders of both countries are rational and willing to
work as hard as possible to maintain this collective value and sharing of
interests. Taiwans China policies reaffirm this assumption. In light of the
twenty-year timeline for strategic development that Beijing continues to
emphasize, it is likely that they will take advantage of the current atmosphere
of peaceful development and will not be so cavalier as to completely sacrifice
rationality and initiate a war.
The reason for maintaining caution is that cross-strait relations are still
relatively dynamic and complex, containing three levels of interactive factors.
These include the factors behind China and Taiwans own personal goals,
cross-strait interactive factors, and international factors, in particular the
Asia-Pacific strategic landscape, dominated largely by the US. The factors among
these three levels are interrelated and are in fact highly interactive. If any
one of them experiences a problem, it will affect the whole, and so the world
must be cautious.
Being cautious and optimistic is a kind of attitude, and this can only become
the predominant attitude in guiding cross-strait relations if there are
interactions across all these levels in order to enhance mutual understanding.
In addition, if Taiwan and China can put themselves in each others shoes, each
can foster a sense of appreciation for the others position, and perhaps this
historical dilemma can be solved within this generation.
Before the ending of my briefing, I would like to bring your attention to the
shared value between international community and Taiwan that make both a
democratic and prosperous community. Let me emphasize again, it is this
administrations policy to be a responsible stakeholder of the international
community and contribute to the preservation of the status quo across the Taiwan
Strait. Cross-strait relations are complex and constantly changing. Over the
past years, our friends in the media have made earnest efforts to conduct news
coverage of cross-strait relations and have offered their comments on related
issues. In this regard, I would like to express my sincere respect and
appreciation.
Thank you very much! I wish all of you a pleasant afternoon!