1. EXPANDED LENGTH:This Defense White Paper (White Paper hereafter) of some 30,000
words is lengthier than its predecessor, "China's Arms Control and Disarmament"
of November 16, 1995 (almost 10,000 words). We are pleased by Beijing's move toward
internationally accepted norm of behavior. We hope that Beijing's endeavor continue.
2. LIMITED TRANSPARENCY:Distinct from common international practice, White Paper's
coverage on PRC defense intention and capability (e.g. deployment, weaponry &
training) approaches nil. The bulk of White Paper discusses military law, international
military cooperation, and arms control and disarmament. We regret to see the limited
military transparency demonstrated therein.
3. DEFENSE EXPENDITURE QUESTIONED:A persistent source of controversy, Beijing's
actual defense expenditure has been estimated to range between two to ten times
the official figure (see "Comparative Western Analyses of Chinese Defense
Budgets"). White Paper does not clarify the often raised queries such as:
- Does the official figure include expenditures for defense R&D, military
education, civilian employees in the military, and extra-budgetary items (e.g.
US$1.3 billion purchase of Sukhoi-27 fighters)?
- In comparison with other nations' defense expenditures, does Beijing include
purchasing power parity in the computation of its own (see "Estimated Chinese
Defense Spending: Various Purchasing Power Parity Ratios")?
- Why does White Paper state only three broad expenditure categories (personnel,
maintenance, and equipment) without further breakdowns? "The 1998 National
Defense Report ROC", for example, contains a full chapter on defense expenditure
(pp.123-134).
4. DEFENSE EXPENDITURE GROWTH:Even at face values, the 1989-97 double-digit growth
of Beijing's defense expenditure (average 15.40%) far outstrips PRC 1989-97 inflation
(average 9.42%). White Paper covers up the fact by using 1979-94 figures. Its
state most, "From 1979 to 1994 defense spending increased by 6.22 percent
annually in absolute terms, which represented in real terms a negative growth
of 1.08 percent compared to the 7.3 percent annual increase of the country's general
retail price index of commodities in the same period."
5. ARMS ACQUISITIONS & SALES:The Tables 5 & 6 in White Paper cover arms
sales and acquisitions in 1992-1996. Much is left out.
- Why is 1997 not mentioned?
In 1997, Beijing purchased at least two advanced missile destroyers of Sovremenny
class for US$1billion, and one A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft
for US$250 million (Jane's Defense Weekly Dec. 10/97 p.29).
- Why is left out the 1994 purchase of four Kilo submarines for US$1billion?
- Why has the US still been accusing Beijing (July 29/98 the latest) for selling
missiles to Iran and others after Beijing promised not to anymore?
6. PEOPLE'S ARMED POLICE:White Paper does not mention that in 1996 Beijing began
transferring 14 divisions of People's Liberation Army soldiers(about 100,000)
to People's Armed Police, which has acquired field combat capabilities. Are these
included in the forthcoming reduction of 500,000 PLA soldiers referred to in White
Paper? Does White Paper count the combat-capable 100,000 in PAP as arms reduction?
7. TAIWAN POLICY:The 150-word portion on Taiwan policy in White Paper, only 0.5%
of the whole, reiterates Beijing's established position, with no new addition.
However, White Paper's mentioning that Beijing will renounce the use of force
against Taiwan is contradictory to the Paper's peace-loving theme and its effort
on muting "China threat".