Office of the President
Republic of China (Taiwan)
On October 18, 2007, President Chen Shui-bian was interviewed by The New
York Times. Below is a complete transcript of the interview.
The New York Times (NYT): The events at the Chinese Communist Party
Congress in Beijing caught all of our attention this week. What is your
perception, in particular, of the proposal by President Hu on Monday for
what he characterized as a peace agreement with Taiwan?
President Chen: What we see clearly manifested in the 17th National
Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is the fact that China is a
one-party state, that the CPC runs an authoritarian government, and that no
distinction is made between party and state. This would be unthinkable for
countries and peoples in the community of democracies. In other words, this
party congress has the following significance: first, the CPC is
authoritarian; and second, it is repressive. The CPC's authoritarian regime
emphasizes one-party totalitarian rule and repression, which means that it
has absolutely no concept of democracy, and no respect for others or the
feelings of others who live in the community of democracies, especially the
23 million people of Taiwan.
The stance and belief of the majority of Taiwan's 23 million people is very
clear, namely that Taiwan is an independent, sovereign country. Taiwan is
not part of China, nor a local government of the People's Republic of China
(PRC). Eighty-five percent of the people of Taiwan believe that our
sovereignty only extends to Taiwan, Penghu (the Pescadores), Kinmen, and
Matsu, and does not include mainland China. Moreover, 70 percent of our
people regard themselves as Taiwanese and not Chinese. But Hu Jintao
disregards this fact and sees those people who consider themselves Taiwanese
and not Chinese as his people. Yet more than 75 percent of our people see
Taiwan as an independent, sovereign country. This is the status quo in the
Taiwan Strait. Taiwan is a nation in its own right, and the motherland of
our people. But Hu Jintao still sees China as the motherland of the people
of Taiwan. This completely contradicts the opinion of the majority in
Taiwan.
We have always welcomed the idea of signing a peace accord with China and
have been talking about this for the past seven or eight years. We have
continued to appeal to China's leaders and government to sit down and have a
dialogue on the establishment of a framework for peace and stability. Should
a consensus be reached, we could then sign a peace accord and other related
agreements. However, we oppose any preconditions or framework being set and
any conclusions being reached prior to discussing an agreement. We are even
more opposed to missile threats or the use of non-peaceful means or military
force to coerce any party into signing a peace accord.
I detailed this concept in my 2000 inaugural address, when I said that as
long as China does not intend to use force against Taiwan, then I would
honor my "Four Noes" pledge. But today, the international community only
pays attention to the proposal made by Hu Jintao regarding a peace
agreement, and overlooks the precondition that Hu laid out--that such an
agreement would be possible only if it was signed within the "one China"
framework.
That is why, not long ago, I laid out three conditions that would need to be
met before we could sit down with China and discuss a peace accord. One,
China must openly renounce the use of force against Taiwan. To this end, it
must remove the 988 ballistic missiles it has deployed along its southeast
coast targeted at Taiwan. Two, China must repeal its so-called
"anti-secession law," which represents an attempt to lay a legal basis for a
future invasion of Taiwan. Three, and most important, China must give up
this notion of the "one China" framework it has insisted upon. In this
light, it is very clear now that if we were to sign such a peace treaty
under the framework of the "one China" principle, then I think this would
mean, for the 23 million people of Taiwan, a treaty of surrender.
So, in speaking about their version of the "1992 consensus" regarding "one
China, two interpretations," Ma Ying-jeou and the Kuomintang (KMT) have been
repeatedly lying to themselves, our people, and the rest of the world.
Today, it is very clear that to China and Hu Jintao, there is only one
China, with no separate interpretations on either side. The peace agreement
that Ma Ying-jeou insists can be signed under the "1992 consensus" of "one
China, two interpretations" is not a possibility. The so-called "one China"
principle states that Taiwan is part of China and a local government of the
PRC.
This proposal by Hu not only emphasizes peaceful unification but also the
"one country, two systems" formula. If Taiwan accepted the "one China"
principle and the "one country, two systems" formula, then it would become a
second Hong Kong or Macau. It would be made into a special administrative
region or a local government of China. That would spell the end of Taiwan as
an independent, sovereign country. So, we cannot possibly betray Taiwan and
let this independent, sovereign country disappear and vanish from the world
map just so we can sign a peace accord.
NYT: Mr. Hsieh seemed to welcome the offer by President Hu. Are you
in disagreement with the presidential candidate of your own party? Another
theory is that maybe you and he are coordinating your policies, and you are
trying to take a hard line in order to make your presidential candidate look
like a moderate or centrist.
President Chen: Yeh Chu-lan, Secretary-General of the Office of the
President and Hsieh's campaign chief manager, said that upon hearing the
KMT's welcoming response to Hu's peace treaty proposal, her heart bled. If
Hsieh's own campaign chief manager could make such a remark, how could Frank
Hsieh himself, the presidential candidate for the Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP), welcome Hu Jintao's proposal without any conditions? Even Ma
Ying-jeou said that they [the KMT] would sign a peace treaty only under the
precondition of "one China, two interpretations" in line with the "1992
consensus." But given that it is impossible that China would agree to such a
precondition, even Ma Ying-jeou does not dare to accept such a peace treaty
unconditionally.
Hsieh has made it very clear that he will insist on Taiwan-centric
consciousness. Since it is a precondition that cannot be compromised, there
is no possibility that he would accept a peace treaty under the "one China"
principle, which is in complete contradiction to Taiwan-centric
consciousness. In this regard, Hsieh and I are in total agreement.
Regarding the referendum on joining the United Nations under the name
"Taiwan," some have said that it is my personal agenda and that Frank Hsieh
has held certain reservations regarding this proposal. This is not true. The
proposal was the result of our discussions. And within the party, Frank
Hsieh, a member of the DPP's Central Standing Committee, co-sponsored the
proposal. In fact, none of us opposes the idea of signing a peace treaty,
but everybody has different preconditions and different conditions of
accepting this proposal. Hu has his version and Ma has his conditions, Hsieh
has his conditions and I have my own insistence. So you can say that all of
us like the idea of signing a peace treaty, but it doesn't mean that we
welcome this peace treaty without any conditions--so in that regard, Frank
Hsieh and I are in total agreement on this, and I don't think there's any
room to divide myself and Frank Hsieh.
NYT: But he spoke in terms of being willing to accept an agreement
that gives Taiwan people the initiative and allows a dignified relationship
with China. That seems like a more conciliatory stance than your description
of this proposal as a surrender agreement.
President Chen: If there are any preconditions for a peace treaty,
such as agreeing to the "one China" principle, I am certain that Frank Hsieh
would not accept the treaty. If there were no such preconditions, then of
course I would accept and welcome a peace treaty.
NYT: You're very visible these days, and I understand you are going
to have a seven-part video on YouTube. What role do you see for yourself
beyond May? Russian President Vladimir Putin has talked about becoming Prime
Minister after his second term as President ends. Do you see yourself doing
the same?
President Chen: I will not follow the example of Mr. Putin. After I
step down, I will become an ordinary citizen again, and I will not run again
for any public office, including the premiership.
I always remember what President Clinton had said to me during his visit to
Taiwan on February 27, 2005; he told me that there can be no two presidents
in one country. He was then the retired president, and even though he had
certain disagreements on Bush policy, he told me he would never, never
openly criticize George Bush. I will also keep in mind what former President
Lee Teng-hui said very recently about former presidents. He said they should
not meddle too much in politics. For me, meddling is meddling, no matter to
what extent. After I step down and become a former president, I will refrain
from meddling at all. In fact, I am rather envious of former President Lee
because when he was president, there were no former presidents. Based on
what I have experienced during my seven-plus years as president, I will keep
in mind not to offer advice to the new president.
NYT: If Mr. Ma wins the election, would you be willing to stay on as
Chairman of the DPP?
President Chen: No, but I do not think Ma will be elected. Next year,
if Frank Hsieh is elected, according to the DPP charter, I will not be able
to carry on as party chairman, and he will automatically assume that role as
the new chairman. In the event he does not want to take on that role, a new
chair would have to be elected by party members.
NYT: Would you allow yourself to be elected if Frank Hsieh does not
take that job?
President Chen: No. I have assumed the chairmanship because I see it
as my solemn duty and as a historical mission. For the next seven months, I
will work very hard to be a dedicated party member, to volunteer my help. I
hope to do my best to support and guide this election campaign and to
fulfill my responsibility and duty. Yesterday, when I was sworn in as
chairman, I said that, in the remaining seven months of my term as chairman,
I would have three major missions: one, the January 12 legislative election
of next year, where we want to win at least 50 seats and try to gain a
parliamentary majority; two, I want to ensure that Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang
are elected president and vice president in 2008, which will usher in a new
era of everlasting prosperity in Taiwan--because the Chinese characters of
their names can be read to mean everlasting and "prosperity"; three, I
want to see passed two referenda on illegally acquired party assets [by the
KMT] and Taiwan entering the UN under the name "Taiwan."
So if I could complete these three missions by then, I think I will have
fulfilled my responsibility and duty as the chairman, and also my historical
mission as the president, and I will happily retire and enjoy myself as an
ordinary citizen.
NYT: I want to make my previous question clear. Are you deliberately
taking a hard line toward Beijing in order to help Mr. Hsieh appear as an
electable moderate or centrist? And, if so, is that a coordinated policy
with Mr. Hsieh?
President Chen: I think the UN referendum will be the main focus of
the election campaign. And it is also a very important milestone in the
strengthening and consolidation of Taiwan's democracy. Regarding this, Frank
Hsieh and I have had many discussions, and we reached a consensus and the
same conclusion. So I do not think there is a question of who plays the
hardliner and who plays the moderate.
Besides, I am still the sitting president for the coming seven months. And
as president of this country, I have my own duties and responsibilities to
look after.
Protecting Taiwan and insisting on Taiwan-centric consciousness is the road
that we have chosen, and this is also my solemn duty and responsibility. We
will not allow the flag of Taiwan to be pulled down nor secretly changed. We
should protect Taiwan. This is my responsibility and mission.
Frank Hsieh is the candidate who has insisted on Taiwan-centric
consciousness and the person I feel most comfortable handing power over to.
He is the most dependable candidate, I believe, for the 23 million people of
Taiwan.
NYT: Coming back again to the Chinese Communist Party Congress. As we
look at the likely lineups that might emerge for the new Standing Committee
of the Politburo, do you see a change in what this means for Taiwan? What is
your perception of the quality of leadership of China?
President Chen: Whoever comes into power or falls out of power does
not really change the nature of the CPC. That is, it is a one-party
authoritarian regime. Regardless of whether we are talking about Jiang Zemin
stepping down and Hu Jintao assuming power, or Hu Jintao stepping down and
Li Keqiang or Xi Jinping assuming power, I believe the very nature of the
CPC's one-party despotic and authoritarian rule will not change. So I do not
think much will change.
Some said that when Jiang Zemin stepped down and Hu Jintao took over, Hu
would change his stance toward Taiwan. But things have not turned out that
way. The nature of the party has not changed. It is very clear that the CPC
has continued its efforts to take over Taiwan and make Taiwan a local
government of the PRC. So concerning this point, no matter who is the
leader, it will not change China's goals and ambitions concerning Taiwan.
I think many have been fooled by Hu Jintao. Hu is a formidable rival, sharp
yet merciless -- he is like a smiling tiger, hiding a dagger in a smile,
with honey in his mouth but a sword at his stomach.
Let me give you one example. Eighteen years ago, when the Tiananmen Square
Massacre took place, the international community condemned the Beijing
government's brutal acts, Hu Jintao, then a local administrative chief, was
the first to stand up and support Beijing's actions.
And when Hu Jintao served as Party Chief for the Tibet Autonomous Region, it
was he who stood beside the tanks and helped suppress the Tibetan people.
Under Hu Jintao, military intimidation, diplomatic suppression, and economic
united-front tactics against Taiwan have been even more aggressive than
under Jiang Zemin.
In 2000, there were only 200 missiles deployed against Taiwan. In the past
seven years, the number has increased fivefold. Under Hu Jintao, the number
of missiles deployed now stands at 988. He introduced the so-called
"anti-secession law." Under Jiang Zemin, there was no such legislation.
In terms of a diplomatic war against Taiwan, Hu Jintao has employed his
"three alls" policy--that is, to constrict all Taiwan's international space,
to obstruct Taiwan's participation in all facets in the international arena,
and to snatch away all Taiwan's diplomatic allies.
In April and May of 2005, both Lien Chan and James Soong made trips to China
and kowtowed to the Chinese government. At that time, Hu Jintao said
something that sounded nice. He said that China would support Taiwan's
appropriate participation in the World Health Organization (WHO), but just
two months afterward, that is, in July of 2005, China's health ministry
signed a secret memorandum of understanding with the WHO Secretariat
belittling Taiwan, requiring that whenever Taiwan wants to send medical
experts to participate in meetings and activities of the WHO, it has to gain
prior approval from China's Ministry of Health. And moreover, should an
epidemic occur in Taiwan, the WHO must gain the approval of China before it
sends experts to assist.
UN Resolution 2758, passed in 1971, does not mention Taiwan at all, but Hu
Jintao and the Beijing government have distorted history and pressured the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, into distorting the
resolution as saying that Taiwan is part of the PRC. Nations like the United
States, Japan, Australia, and the United Kingdom have expressed their
opposition to such a distortion.
NYT: Why in your view do American relations with Taiwan seem so
strained as we have seen with the recent criticisms by [the Deputy Secretary
of State] Mr. Negroponte, by [Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs] Mr. Christensen, of some of your policies? Is it
because of what you are doing in Taipei in trying to win membership in the
United Nations or is it because of some broader shift by the United States
towards closer relations with Beijing because it needs it on North Korea,
Iran and other issues?
President Chen: We took special note of the recent remarks made by
President Bush during the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Sydney in
September. On one occasion, he commended Taiwan's democratic transformation,
noting that Taiwan is "a success story," and he pointed out the contribution
Taiwan has made in terms of maintaining peace, security, and stability in
the Asia-Pacific region. We sincerely appreciate his remarks.
We have also noted that during Hu Jintao's opening address this Monday at
the 17th National Congress of the CPC, he did not comment on Taiwan's
referendum to apply for UN membership. Whether this is because of the
concern the US had expressed, which could have made the Chinese leaders
somehow restrain themselves, remains to be seen.
Over the past several months, military exchanges and cooperation between
Taiwan and the United States continued as usual. There were neither setbacks
nor breaks in this regard. Taiwan and the United States have different views
regarding certain issues. This is a fact, and I think that it is
unavoidable. Every country is concerned about its own national interests.
Sometimes the interests of two countries may overlap and sometimes the two
countries may not reach consensus on certain issues. This is only normal,
and that is why we need to have continued dialogue and communication to
further clarify issues and resolve misunderstandings.
The government of Taiwan made a request for military procurement during the
Clinton Administration regarding submarines, P3C anti-submarine fixed-wing
aircraft, and PAC-III missiles, but the Clinton Administration did not
approve the request. It was not until the new administration, that is, the
Bush Administration, came into power, that the arms sales package to Taiwan
was approved.
As for the F-16C/D fighter aircraft, we can understand why although we have
the budget ready, the US government has yet to issue a letter of offer and
acceptance, and that it seems likely that we will have to wait until the new
administration comes into power and the new US president takes office before
the deal can be approved. This follows the same pattern as that seen with
the three previous procurement items, so it is not a surprise to us.
Of course, we have paid close attention to the statements made by the deputy
secretary of state, Mr. Negroponte, as well as the senior director for Asian
affairs of the US National Security Council, Mr. Dennis Wilder. We have
noted that some have said that the status of Taiwan is still undecided, and
therefore Taiwan is not an independent, sovereign country. Some have said
that the referendum on Taiwan's bid to enter the United Nations under the
name "Taiwan" would constitute one step further toward Taiwan independence.
Much has been implied.
Despite such comments by some US officials, the US government shared with us
its strong views on this misinterpretation of UN Resolution 2758 by UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the Chinese government. The US stated that
it would be unable to accept such an interpretation and expressed its
opposition to the misinterpretation of Resolution 2758 to the United Nations
on several occasions. This implies that the US government does not support
or agree with the claim that Taiwan is a part of the PRC.
Regarding the referendum on Taiwan's entry into the United Nations, this is
the most direct and democratic way for our 23 million people to express to
the world their strong aspiration, expectation, and collective voice to join
and become a formal member of the United Nations.
Holding such a referendum does not involve changing the national moniker,
nor does it violate the "Four Noes" pledge.
Even if the referendum is passed, we will not become a UN member. We still
need to apply for membership according to the proper procedures and
regulations of the General Assembly and also the Security Council. The US
could then still oppose our move and China could still use its veto power,
but the point is that we want our collective voice to be heard by the whole
world. The 23 million people of Taiwan will not be silenced just because of
China's military intimidation, its missiles pointed at us, its coercion, and
its threats.
NYT: I have two last questions if I may now; first on the military
and then on economics. On the military, will Taiwan deploy cruise missiles
with a range sufficient to reach Shanghai, and second, will Taiwan deploy
short-range ballistic missiles?
President Chen: Part of being a member of the community of
democracies involves strengthening our national defense and enhancing our
self-defense capabilities, because it is a duty and responsibility to defend
and safeguard peace, stability, and security in the Taiwan Strait and to
avoid the military balance tilting in China's favor.
Having an "effective deterrence and a solid defense" is the guiding
principle of our national defense policy and, therefore, we will under no
circumstance engage in an arms race with China. Being prepared does not mean
seeking a future war; it is to make sure war does not happen--to ensure
peace.
Should there be any R&D or deployment of defensive weaponry, we will be
frank about that and communicate directly with the US Defense Department.
Communication and dialogue on this is going on all the time. Since last
year, there has been no break in communication. Recently, in fact, some of
our commanding officers went to the US. Exchanges between our two sides have
been excellent.
NYT: So would you classify cruise missiles, separately, ballistic
missiles, as defensive weapons in this context?
President Chen: They, of course, are part of our R&D and deployment
of defensive weapons, which are in line with our strategic goal of effective
deterrence and a solid defense. By so doing, we can also live up to the US
expectation that Taiwan shoulders the responsibility of enhancing its
self-defense capabilities.
NYT: Last question, and I appreciate your spending so much time. You
talked in your 10/10 [national day] speech about how you thought the
mini-three-links had helped the Taiwanese economy grow. Would full three
links then help your stock market, which has lagged those in China and Hong
Kong; help your manufacturing, which seems to be moving to the mainland;
your tourism industry? Can the Taiwanese economy prosper without full three
links?
President Chen: Our stock market index is 1,000 points higher than
when I took office as President on May 20, 2000. Of course, this is not the
whole story, but we cannot be too naïve and so deluded as to think that, with
the three links [direct postal, transportation, and commercial links],
Taiwan's economy will immediately perk up. This is too simplistic, a case of
wishful thinking.
Rather than imagining that Taiwan's economy would take off after launching
the three links under Beijing's "one China" principle, should we not take an
alternative approach and ask, would not our entire economy be boosted if we
could join the United Nations and become a full member? Then, we could
freely conduct talks with the entire world and sign free trade agreements,
and we could take part in all of the organizations under the UN umbrella,
including the IMF and World Bank.
Taiwan's relationship with China is a country-to-country relationship. Of
course airplanes can fly directly between one country and another, as
between Taiwan and the United States or Japan. If Taiwan today were a full
member of the UN, there would of course be nothing strange about direct
flights between Taiwan and any city in China. Should we not instead be
stressing that only if Taiwan is admitted to the UN can it look forward to
steady economic growth?
In fact, during my seven years as President, we have seen an unprecedented
intensiveness and closeness of economic relations and business cooperation
between Taiwan and China, including Taiwanese investment in China. This
administration launched the "mini-three-links" [direct mail and commercial
links are already in place, while direct transportation is only provided
between Taiwan's Kinmen, Matsu and Penghu islands and ports in China's
Fujian Province] and has expanded it--something that had not been done
before 2000. Moreover, 70 percent of Taiwan's outbound investment goes to
China, and 90 percent of Taiwan-based manufacturers' orders are filled by
factories in China. So, with regard to Taiwan-China economic relations and
China-bound investment, the problem is one of overheating, not of any
inadequacy.
Taiwan is an island nation, but we belong to the world and are not cut off
from it. So we have to stride out into the world in order to have a path of
survival and a bright future. We know Taiwan cannot afford to isolate
itself, but we most certainly cannot put all our resources and economic
lifeblood into China.
In consideration of our national security and national interest, we cannot
afford to throw our doors open to a belligerent China that refuses to
renounce the use of force against us and is actively scheming to annex us.
Therefore, we have to adopt a policy of active management in conjunction
with effective liberalization in our economic relations with China. Our
guiding principle is to move forward pragmatically while maintaining a firm
stance [regarding protection of our national interest].
No worthy goal can be achieved overnight. Things must progress in a steady,
step-by-step manner. So only after launching the [experimental]
mini-three-links could there be the three full links. Similarly, we already
have direct charter flights between Taiwan and China and have expanded them
to include four categories [passenger flights on certain holidays as well as
special-case cargo flights, ambulance flights, and other humanitarian
flights]. We hope, first, to further open up regular direct cargo charter
flights, to be followed by regular direct passenger charter flights and,
finally by ordinary scheduled flight services. This cannot be done in one
fell swoop.
Direct transportation is no panacea for enhancing Taiwan's economic
development. This applies to the recent promises made by KMT presidential
candidate Ma Ying-jeou. If elected, he says, he will totally open up Taiwan
to direct flights between Taiwan and China. In Hualien, he promises to start
direct flights from Hualien Airport. In Taitung, it is Taitung Airport. In
Taichung, it is Taichung Airport. He wants direct flights to everywhere he
goes. Can Taiwan accept this?
I do not think so. Looking at the matter from the perspective of national
security, if we throw all our doors wide open, it would be like giving China
the chance to penetrate to any locale without meeting with resistance. Could
we then maintain the semblance of a nation?
If Taiwan is a nation, then Ma Ying-jeou cannot possibly make good on his
promise within one year after being elected, as he says he will. This cannot
happen unless he intends to demote Taiwan to the status of a locale of
China, turning it into another special administrative region like Hong Kong
or Macau, or into a province like Fujian or Jiangsu. If that happened, then,
of course, he would have kept his promise. But could the people of Taiwan
accept this?
[In the case of discrepancies between the English and Chinese texts, the
Chinese should be taken as authoritative.]
【Source: Office of the President】