By Jaushieh Joseph Wu
The Taiwan Strait has often come in the international media's spotlight, as
many people throughout the world fear that tensions between Taiwan and China
might intensify to an unmanageable degree. As one of the countries at the center
of this gathering storm, it is in Taiwan's own interests, as well as those of
other parties, to present some of the facts pertinent to this matter and to make
its policies clear to the international community.
The situation across the Taiwan Strait is more complicated than usually
presented by the media, and it is necessary to take into consideration the
numerous interrelated dimensions if a clear picture is to be seen. These include
the military and diplomatic confrontations, parallel historical developments,
and economic interdependence of the two sides. At the center of this complex
intersection of conflicting elements, Taiwan would also like the international
community to understand that the pursuit of peace is its paramount objective.
First dimension: Military buildup and diplomatic confrontation
It is known from a number of widely available sources that China's military
budget began to expand rapidly in 1994, and has had double-digit growth in
almost every year since. This is far in excess of China's economic growth rate
and, by comparison, Taiwan's military budget has stagnated. Taking 2003 as an
example, according to the Beijing authorities' own published figures, China's
military budget topped US$23 billion, which is almost three times the figure
spent on defense by Taiwan. This fact alone provides a number of reasons for
concern.
Much of China's growing military budget has been spent on foreign
procurement, including Su-27 and Su-30 fighter jets, sovrenmenny-class
destroyers, kilo-class submarines, and other advanced weapon systems. China's
deployment of missiles is also a cause for worry, with around 550 short- to
mid-range ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan from the southeastern coastal
region. Some in Washington DC have been moved to describe China's missile
deployment as the most destabilizing factor in the region. In addition to these
increasingly accurate, traditional ballistic missiles, China has also been
developing, and possibly deploying, multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles (MIRVs) and cruise missiles, thus further destabilizing the situation.
Immediate need
In such circumstances, Taiwan's most immediate need is to prevent this military
imbalance from tilting so far that China thinks it can use force against its
tiny neighbor without the fear of an effective defense force. In order to
prevent the cross-strait military situation from deteriorating further, Taiwan's
government is moving to strengthen its defense, which explains its attempts to
pass a special budget for necessary air, submarine, and missile defense
capabilities.
Of similar seriousness to this military buildup and, perhaps, even more
destabilizing due to the strong emotions involved, is the confrontation in the
diplomatic arena. Taiwan's existence, under the formal national title of the
Republic of China (ROC), is denied by the People's Republic of China (PRC),
which claims sovereignty over Taiwan. It has proclaimed that there is only one
China, that the PRC represents China, and that Taiwan is but a province of the
PRC. It uses this one China principle to exclude Taiwan from international
affairs, causing much antagonism among the people of Taiwan, and resulting in
feelings of hostility towards China, as is repeatedly shown in public opinion
surveys.
One example that illustrates this point occurred on July 23, 2002. On the eve
of ROC President Chen Shui-bian's swearing in as chairman of the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP), the PRC announced that Nauru, one of Taiwan's
diplomatic allies in the South Pacific, was switching diplomatic ties from
Taipei to Beijing. It later emerged that China had bought this allegiance with
US$137 million in economic aid, for a country of only 10,700 citizens. This move
and the timing of its announcement were unambiguously intended to humiliate
Taiwan and its democratically elected president. Although the international
community paid little attention, the government and people of Taiwan were deeply
affected.
No sign
As of summer 2004, Taiwan has not detected any sign or trend suggesting that
China has reversed, or even slowed, its strategy of diplomatically isolating
Taiwan. Indeed, in the first half of 2004, the Beijing authorities seem to have
been working hard to woo Taiwan's diplomatic allies in Latin America. The PRC
has even threatened to cut the UN's aid to those countries maintaining
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. If China starts to tighten its grip on these
nations, it will initiate a new round of crisis across the Taiwan Strait.
Second dimension: Interdependence in non-political areas
In contrast to this military buildup and diplomatic confrontation, economic
integration and cultural exchange across the Taiwan Strait present a
dramatically different picture. For humanitarian reasons, in 1987 the Taiwan
government started to allow its citizens the right, albeit limited, to visit
relatives in China. In the 17 years since this first opening up, travel between
the two sides has mushroomed. There have been a total of 31 million visits by
Taiwans people to China, averaging around 3 million visits annually in recent
years. In the same period, PRC citizens have made more than 1 million visits to
Taiwan. This is just one small but significant example of the reality that lies
behind what is widely perceived as the Taiwan-China tension.
Cross-strait trade has also expanded year-on-year, reaching US$46.3 billion
in 2003. China accounts for around one quarter of Taiwan's export market and
about 17 percent of Taiwan's total international trade. Some people have even
suggested that these high levels of trade with the PRC make Taiwan too dependent
on China.
Tremendous increase
Moreover, Taiwanese investment in China has increased tremendously, amounting
accumulatively to at least US$70 billion. This represents around half of all
Taiwans direct overseas investment and, in recent years, has risen to more than
60 percent of total outbound investment.
Many have speculated that this acceleration of capital flow to China over
recent years has been driven by Taiwan's higher labor costs. While previously
this may have been the case, analysis of the latest Taiwanese investments in
China show that there has been a shift from labor-intensive manufacturing to
more capital- and technology-intensive production. Furthermore, careful
examination of recent large investment projects shows a clear and successful
division of labor with Taiwanese working on innovation and design while Chinese
concentrate on manufacturing and exporting.
After taking up the reins of government in May 2000, DPP leaders adopted a
series of liberalization policies aimed at improving cross-strait exchanges.
These included setting up direct transportation links between China's southeast
coast and the ROC offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu, liberalizing the go
slow, be patient policy, preparing for future direct shipping and air
transportation links, permitting Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan, and allowing
charter flights to China.
The government also allowed specialists in a variety of fields to visit
Taiwan, universities to use textbooks written in China's simplified characters,
and China's media to station journalists in Taiwan. These measures were all
aimed at increasing mutual understanding and bringing reason to the previously
confrontational atmosphere of cross-strait relations. Nevertheless, many
international observers, hearing the Beijing authorities harsh language and
seeing their threats and preparations for war, still conclude that the Taiwan
Strait is potentially one of the most explosive flashpoints in the world.
Domestic politics
Despite China's rapid social and economic changes, there has not yet been an
equivalent political transformation towards a more responsive system. Moreover,
because of the lack of democratic rules regarding any change in leadership,
there are increasing indications that serious competition is fermenting between
rival political factions. As usual, competition for power within the PRC
expresses itself in the form of policy debate. In 2004, this debate seems to be
focused on the issue of Taiwan, as well as the related question of how to deal
with the United States in the face of improving Taiwan-US ties. As this debate
progresses, Taiwan's leadership is being used as a scapegoat and its policies
are twisted to fit the theory that Taiwan is ill intentioned and, therefore,
that Beijing must adopt a hostile posture when dealing with Taiwan. This
explains one of the main causes for current tensions in the Taiwan Strait, that
they are driven by the PRC's domestic political agenda.
Internal political differences in China tend to become exaggerated and ignite
domestic feuds since the PRC's decision-making process is not transparent, and
its leadership selection and recruitment processes are still closed to
institutional oversight, media scrutiny, or popular participation. There are
still no signs as to how soon people in China might be able to choose their own
leaders, or even when the political system might be more responsive to public
opinion. It can be expected, therefore, that Taiwan will continue to be used as
a scapegoat for some time to come.
Unlike China, Taiwan embarked on the process of democratization in the late
1980s. This culminated in the first direct presidential election in 1996, and
first peaceful transfer of power between political parties in 2000. The peaceful
nature of these transformations has been recognized internationally as a
tremendous political achievement.
Major trend
Moreover, since Taiwan is a democracy, major policies must meet the approval of
a majority of the people through legislative oversight and periodic elections.
The public also reacts to cross-strait developments and international
situations. China's diplomatic oppression of Taiwan, for example, has had a
counterproductive effect that China did not foresee, with more than 50 percent
of Taiwan's people now identifying themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese.
This trend has been interpreted as evidence of Taiwan's desire for independence,
however, and China does not seem to realize that the main force behind it has
been the PRC's own hostile posture toward Taiwan. Meanwhile, it continues to
formulate policies that will merely encourage this trend and force Taiwan's
people to conclude that China is afraid of Taiwan's democracy and its people's
right to express their views.
Taiwan's democratization has many facets, and China would do well to pay
closer attention to the results of public opinion surveys in Taiwan. Regarding
future relations with China, for example, surveys asking whether people support
independence, the status quo, or unification with China have consistently shown
that between 70 and 80 percent of Taiwan's people opt for a broadly defined
status quo. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Taiwan's public
opinion on cross-strait issues is one of the most important foundations of
cross-strait stability.
People in Taiwan are beginning to wonder if it might be Taiwan's democracy
that China objects to, rather than Taiwan independence per se. For China to
better understand how Taiwan's people view the future of cross-strait relations,
it should realize that most people70 percent in a July 2004 pollare sensitive
to China's hostility toward Taiwan government. This merely illustrates how
China's Taiwan policies can be counterproductive to its stated policy goal of
bringing Taiwan closer. If China does indeed want Taiwan's public to view it
more favorably, it should act in a less threatening manner.
Constitutional revision
Another misinterpretation by China concerns Taiwan's plans for constitutional
revision, which is due to start early next year. The PRC has been announcing to
the world that, if Taiwan goes ahead with constitutional revision, this could
lead to war. The truth is, however, that Taiwan has a genuine need to revise its
Constitution. The current Constitution was written in 1947 in China, and was
designed for use in China. It has provisions for seven major branches of
government, which are supposed to act as checks and balances of each another.
This system is merely hypothetical and cannot function, as it differs completely
from the realities of the existing political system. For example, due to the
nature of Taiwan's electoral system, the public sees the legislative
branchLegislative Yuanas a key source of the nation's political problems.
Taiwan has also been deliberating over whether elimination of provincial and
village level governments would improve administrative efficiency. Other issues,
such as voting age, military recruitment, economic regulation, indigenous
peoples' rights, etc., all require constitutional revision if they are to be
addressed properly.
Procedures for constitutional revision will follow those prescribed by the
current Constitution. A Constitution Bill must firstly be adopted by a
three-quarter majority of the Legislative Yuan. A National Assembly would then
be elected according to proportional representation, and it too would need to
approve the Legislative Yuan's bill by a three-quarter majority. As promised by
President Chen in his inauguration speech, issues relating to national
sovereignty, such as the national title and national flag, will not be dealt
with by the ruling party. The high thresholds required for this procedure should
ensure that any radical proposals will be vetoed.
China continues to threaten Taiwan over its intention to revise the
Constitution as if the people of Taiwan do not have the right to an improved
political system. This threat raises concern in the international community over
whether constitutional revision by Taiwan constitutes a unilateral change of
the status quo. Actually, one could say that the better Taiwans democracy
functions, the more Chinese peoplewhether in Hong Kong, China, or wherevercan
emulate it. Taiwan's democracy is, therefore, the best hope for all Chinese
people the world over.
Four stages
Since Taiwan is already a democracy and its people are willing to seek
reconciliation with China, Taiwan's government would like to deescalate regional
tensions and bring the two sides of the Taiwan Strait together to create a
cooperative mode by the following four stages.
In the first stage, already underway, Taiwan is pursuing a conciliatory and
open policy toward China, even if this requires unilateral gestures of goodwill.
Taiwan's government has reviewed its cultural and economic exchange policies,
and would like to expand the scope of these cross-strait interactions.
In the second stage, Taiwan will pursue dialogue and negotiation with China
on substantive issues, such as currency exchange, investment protection,
avoidance of double taxation, legal arbitration, IPR protection, tourism,
repatriation of illegal immigrants, joint efforts to combat cross-strait crime,
and direct transportation links. Through negotiation of these substantive
issues, Taiwan and China may slowly build confidence and gain each other's
trust. When agreements on these issues are reached, the two sides will enter a
new era of cooperation. At that stage the environment should be such that
dialogue on more thorny political issues can begin.
Interim framework
In the third stage, Taiwan will seek to establish an interim framework for peace
and stability to govern the activities between the two sides before a final
settlement can be found. The pursuit and maintenance of peace should be the
paramount guideline within this framework so as to ensure that neither side
resorts to extreme means to change the status quo. The two sides should pursue
political negotiations according proper mechanisms, establishing appropriate
political relations, carrying out military confidence building measures that
will prevent any accidental incidents from erupting into major conflicts.
In the fourth and final stage, the two sides will work out their political
differences for a final settlement. Whatever form this takes, Taiwan should be
able to maintain its self-rule without jeopardizing its democratic system.
Taiwan should also be guaranteed the right to be a member of the international
community and to participate in international bodies, such as the United Nations
and its affiliated organizations. Taiwan does not exclude any form of political
relationship with China, so long as Taiwan's democracy is recognized and the
people agree to it.
Even before China has agreed to engage in the dialogue proposed in the second
stage, Taiwan has already made unilateral efforts to hold out olive branches to
China. For example, it has already allowed more journalists to be stationed in
Taiwan, will soon allow Chinese actors to participate in Taiwan filmmaking, and
is evaluating other policy measures that will improve cultural and economic
exchanges. Recently, Taiwan has strongly urged China to resume its dialogue with
Taiwan since this will help achieve China's stated aim of bringing Taiwan closer
rather than pushing it further away.
The Taiwan Strait has been described by many as one of the most volatile
areas in the world. Any military conflict will certainly bring devastating
results to the region and, therefore, is not in anyones interest. Since
commencement of the Taiwan government's new term on May 20th, 2004, it has
spoken with prudence and acted with goodwill in trying to reconcile the
differences with China. These efforts have been appreciated by the international
community, and it is time that more followed the lead of those major nations
which have urged the PRC to look more carefully at Taiwan's policies, actions,
and intentions, and to resume dialogue with Taiwan. The international community
should also remind China that peace and development should be the most important
objectives in cross-strait relations, especially in light of the peaceful rise
China has proclaimed as its national endeavor. As always, it takes two to make
peace, and China should make a public proclamation that it will pursue peace in
resolving its differences with Taiwan. Peace should color the language used by
all parties concerned.
China is a great nation with a long and proud history; its civilization has
been glorious, not through conquering others but by accommodating them. China
will continue to be a great power not by intimidating Taiwan but by
accommodating and living peacefully with Taiwan. The reward for China to reach
peace with Taiwan outweighs those of conflict or stalemate. China has wasted the
four years of President Chen's first term by not responding to Taiwans repeated
calls for meaningful dialogue. A widening of the distance between the two sides
has certainly not benefited Chinas interest. Those in the international
community who are concerned with cross-strait relations should remind China's
leaders of this simple but important fact.
(This article originally appeared in the New Zealand International Review,
September 1, 2004.)
Jaushieh Joseph Wu
Chairman, Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan