Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chairperson Jaushieh Joseph Wu pointed out in his article specially written for the recently issued September/Octover edition of the bimonthly New Zealand International Review magazine, that “peace” and “development” should be the paramount objectives in cross-strait relations. Taiwan has already made every effort to pursue peace and made unilateral efforts to hold out olive branches to China. China should make a public proclamation that it will pursue peace in resolving its differences with Taiwan. It will not be in China’s interests if China continues to coerce or intimidate Taiwan because it will merely widen the gap already exists between two sides of the Strait.
Chairperson Wu’s article was placed right after New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark’s congratulatory article on the seventieth anniversary of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs with insertion of some excellent pictures of President Chen Shui-bian’s inauguration ceremony, First Lady Wu Shu-chen’s meeting with Pope John Paul II during her Treasuring Taiwan, Befriending in Culture trip, and Taiwan’s Tzu Chi Foundation providing relief materials to a disaster area in Indonesia; both reflected the attentive attitude of the magazine toward Chairperson Wu’s article.
Chairperson Wu said in the article that the situation across the Taiwan Strait is more complicated than usually presented by the media. It includes the military and diplomatic confrontations, parallel historical developments, and economic interdependence of the two sides. Despite China’s rapid social and economic changes, there has not yet been an equivalent political transformation towards a more responsive system. Moreover, because of the lack of domocratic rules regarding any change in leadership, there are increasing indications that serious competition is fermenting between rival political factions. As usual, competition for power within the PRC expresses itself in the form of policy debate. In 2004, this debate seems to be focused on the issue of Taiwan, as well as the related question of how to deal with the United States in the face of improving Taiwan-US ties. As this debate progresses, Taiwan’s leadership is being used as a scapegoat and its policies are twisted to fit the theory that Taiwan is ill intentioned and, therefore, that Beojing must adop a hostil posture when dealing with Taiwan. Unlike China, Taiwan embarked on the process of democratization in the late 1980s. This culminated in the first direct presidential election in 1996, and first peaceful transfer of power between political parties in 2000. The peaceful nature of these tranformations has been recognized internationally as a tremendous political achievement and a good political model for Hong Kong and China. Taiwan’s democratization has many facets, and China would do well to pay closer attention to the results of public opinion surveys in Taiwan. Regarding future relations with China, for example, surveys asking whether people support independence, the status quo, or unification with China have consistently shown that between 70 an 80 percent of Taiwan’s people opt for a broadly defined status quo. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Taiwan’s public opinion on cross-strait issues is one of the most important foundations of cross-strait stability. Most people in Taiwan are sentitive to China’s hostility toward Taiwan government. This merely illustrates how China’s Taiwan policies can be counterproductive to its stated policy goal of bringing Taiwan closer.
Chairperson Wu pointed out further that Taiwan’s governemnt wuld like to deescalate regional tensions and bring the two sides of the Taiwan Strait together to create a cooperative lode by the following four stages: In the first stage, already underway, Taiwan is pursuing a conciliatory and open policy toward China, even if this requires unilateral gestures of goodwill. Taiwan’s government has reviewed its cultural and economic exchange policies, and would like to expand the scope of these cross-strait interactions. In the scond stage, Taiwan will pursue dialogue and negotiation with China on substative issues, such as currency exchange, investment proteciton, avoindance of double taxation, legal arbitration, IPR protection, tourism, repatriation of illegal immigrants, joint efforts to combat cross-strait crime, and direct transportation links. In the third stage, Taiwan will seek to establish an interim framework for peace and stability to govern the activities between the two sides before a final settlement can be found. The pursuit and maintenance of peace should be the paramount guideline within this framework so as to ensure that neither side resorts to extreme means to change the status quo. In the fourth and final stage, the two sides will work out their political differences for a final settlement. Whatever form this takes, Taiwan should be able to maintain its self-rule without jeopardizing its democratic system. Taiwan does not exclude any form of political relationship with China, so long as Taiwan’s democracy is recognized and the people agree to it.
Chairperson Wu asked the international community to urge the PRC to look more carefully at Taiwan’s policies, actions, and intentions, and to resume dialogue with Taiwan. China has wasted the four years of President Chen’s first term by not responding to Taiwan’s repeated calls for meaningful dialogue. A widening of the distance between the two sides has certainly not benefited China’s interest.