

# **“One Law, Two Communiqués”: The Shackle Enchaining the Destiny of the Taiwanese People**

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On March 14, 2005, the Chinese government passed the “Anti-Separation Law” (ASL) unilaterally defining the status quo of cross-strait relations. With wording such as “a legacy of the Chinese civil war,” the ASL attempts to deny the reality that Taiwan and China have no jurisdiction over each other. At the same time, it stipulates the use of “non-peaceful” means as an option in resolving the Taiwan Strait issue. In the three years since the ASL was enacted, China has ignored the fact and status quo that Taiwan is a sovereign country. It has continued to use the ASL to suppress Taiwan’s international personality and its space for democratic development. At the same time, China has manipulated the two-pronged “carrot-and-stick” united front strategy against Taiwan to drive a wedge into Taiwan’s society and create social antagonism. This has led to the deterioration in cross-strait relations and an escalation in political and military confrontation and tensions, while posing a serious threat to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

It is especially noteworthy that, after passing the SAL, the Beijing authorities invited the chairmen of Taiwan’s opposition parties to visit China. China has produced the “Lien-Hu Communiqué” and the “Soong-Hu Communiqué,” setting up a new “one law, two communiqués” framework for dealing with Taiwan in an attempt to achieve the ultimate strategic goal of gradually unifying Taiwan. This has posed another severe challenge to the Taiwanese government’s China policy. The significance, practice and dangers of the “one law, two communiqués” concocted by China are explained below:

## **1. What is the “one law, two communiqués”?**

The so-called “one law” refers to the ASL, while the “two communiqués” are press communiqués issued after the “Lien-Hu” and “Soong-Hu” meetings. On March 14, 2005, China’s National People’s Congress passed the so-called ASL in disregard of opposition by the major countries of the world. The ASL clearly authorizes China’s State Council and the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party

of China to resolve the so-called “Taiwan issue” by non-peaceful means under three situations, thereby legalizing China’s “stick” strategy toward Taiwan. Moreover, the ASL stipulates the advancement and encouragement of cross-strait cultural, educational, social, economic and trade exchange policies in order to embody China’s “carrot” strategy toward Taiwan. Since the passage of the ASL, the Beijing authorities successively invited former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong to visit Beijing, during which time the so-called press communiqués for the “Lien-Hu” and “Soong-Hu” meetings were issued, respectively. Therefore, it can be said that the “one law, two communiqués” has been produced entirely with the Beijing authorities taking initiative, while Lien Chan and James Soong simply playing supporting roles. This issue can be further expounded from the following three perspectives.

**(1) The “two communiqués” constitute an endorsement of Beijing’s definition of the “one China principle”**

The two communiqués fully accept the political framework and policies toward Taiwan as established by the Beijing authorities under the “Anti-Separation Law.” That is, they adhere to the “1992 Consensus” that embodies the “one China” principle, unswervingly oppose “Taiwan independence,” and seek the early completion of the great task of unifying the “motherland.” Article 1 of the ASL stipulates that, “This Law is formulated, in accordance with the Constitution, for the purpose of opposing and checking Taiwan’s secession from China by secessionists in the name of ‘Taiwan independence’, promoting peaceful national reunification, maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, preserving China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation.” It continues in Article 5 to stipulate that, “Upholding the principle of one China is the basis of peaceful reunification of the country.” By “in accordance with the Constitution,” the law refers to the preamble of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. This states that, “Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China. It is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.”

With regard to the “Lien-Hu Communiqué,” this document states clearly at the outset that the KMT and Communist Party of China (CPC) have reached a consensus

on adhering to the “1992 Consensus” and opposing “Taiwan independence.” The “1992 Consensus” mentioned by the “Lien-Hu Communiqué” does not clearly refer to as the consensus on the “one China principle;” however, it is not described as a consensus on “one China, with each side having its own interpretation.” The “Soong-Hu Communiqué,” on the other hand, clearly rejects the statement of “one China, with each side having its own interpretation,” and firmly insists on the “one China principle,” as evident from the first point of the Communiqué:

*The consensus reached by both sides in 1992 should be respected (The original text of the oral statements made by the Straits Exchange Foundation [SEF] and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits [ARATS] in 1992: SEF Statement—“In the process of their common effort to achieve national unification, both sides will adhere to the one China principle but they differ from each other on the acknowledgement of the meaning of one China.”; ARATS statement—“The two sides of the Strait should abide by the one China principle and should make efforts to achieve national unification. However, the routine negotiations between the two organizations will not involve the political connotations of one China.”)*

*On the basis of the respective interpretations of both sides on their adherence to the one China principle, that is the “1992 Consensus” (“two sides, one China”), both sides must promptly resume equitable consultations and negotiations, maintain mutual respect, seek common grounds while setting aside differences, and pragmatically resolve the major issues that are of concern to both sides.*

This content completely upends the blue camp’s steadfast position that the “1992 Consensus” is “one China, with each side having its own interpretation.” In the first paragraph, there was an attempt to return to the facts of the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong—in which both sides have different interpretations of the significance of the “one China principle” in the course of their negotiations. However, in the second paragraph there not only has been no respect for this type of difference, but the content has been reinterpreted and re-pitched as: “*the respective interpretations of both sides on their adherence to the ‘one China’ principle, that is the “1992 Consensus” (“two sides, one China”).*” It would be better to say nothing at all, for the more that is said the worse it gets, even to the point of accepting Beijing’s long-held definition of “both sides adhere to the ‘one China’ principle.” Moreover, the new phrase of “two sides, one China” has been created as an equivalent of the “1992 Consensus.” In fact, “two sides, one China” is fundamentally a “new syllogism” of the “one China principle.” It is also what is

clearly defined in Article 2 of the “Anti-Separation Law” as: “There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division.” Even former MAC Chairman Su Chi, who conceived the wording of “1992 Consensus,” believes that China’s such an interpretation sets the tone of the “1992 Consensus” as “two sides, one China,” which is in fact “a bit more one China and a bit less each side free to make its own interpretation.”

*China Times* reporter Chu Chien-ling, who observed the “Soong-Hu” meeting in Beijing, also issued a press release stating that “According to the sources, under certain premises, the mainland is willing to compromise on the issue of the respective political positions of Taiwan and China, over which the PFP delegation has actively expressed concern. However, there is no room for compromise on the essence of one China. In other words, China may give Taiwan face, but the mainland will not give even an inch on the lining.”<sup>1</sup> This outside commentary and press observation forced PFP Chairman James Soong to issue a rushed clarification at the airport upon his return to Taiwan, stating that “two sides, one China” means “one China with different interpretation by each side.” However, this interpretation is nowhere to be found on China’s official websites. No wonder Mr. Shih Ming-teh later stated in an interview with a reporter of the *United Daily News* that: “Mr. Soong’s handling of the issue of ‘one China, with each side having its own interpretation’ was too hurried and addressed a matter that should be delayed between both sides of the Strait. No one can understand ‘two sides, one China.’ If ‘two sides, one China’ means ‘one China with different interpretation by each side,’ why didn’t Soong say so in China? Why did he say so only after returning to Taiwan?”<sup>2</sup> In fact, in his welcome speech when receiving James Soong, Hu Jintao stated clearly from the outset that “Chairman Soong and the PFP firmly insist on the ‘1992 Consensus’ that embodies the ‘one China principle,’ firmly oppose Taiwan independence, and advocate the development of cross-strait relations. We highly affirm and appreciate this.” This set the tone for James Soong. And with Hu’s home court advantage, Soong was fundamentally unable to contradict. It could be said that he indeed swallowed a big loss. This is why he issued his hasty clarification only after stepping off the plane in Taiwan, but by then it was too late. However, this made President Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government even more firmly convinced that there was no consensus in 1992 on “one China, with

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<sup>1</sup> Chu, Chien-ling, 2005, “The Mainland will Not Budge Even an Inch on the Content of the 1992 Consensus,” *China Times*, May 06, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Lo, Hsiao-ho, 2005, “Shih Ming-teh: Delaying the Sovereignty Issue is the Best Strategy,” *United Daily News*, May 23, 2005.

each side having its own interpretation.” The “1992 Consensus” addressed in the press communiqués for the “Lien-Hu” and “Soong-Hu” meetings was fundamentally an endorsement of Beijing’s definition of the “one China principle.”

**(2) The “two communiqués” fully echo the “one law”**

The cross-strait negotiation issues set by the “Lien-Hu Communiqué” and the “Soong-Hu Communiqué” are fundamentally a continuation of those defined by the “Anti-Separation Law.” The content of the three documents may be compared as follows (also in reference to Table 3-1):

The wording of Subparagraph 1 of Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the “anti-separation law” reads: “to encourage and facilitate personnel exchanges across the Straits for greater mutual understanding and mutual trust.” The “Lien-Hu Communiqué” echoes this wording as: “To establish an regular forum for equal communication between the CCP and the KMT, including mutual visits between party members of different ranks,.....and to invite people from all walks of life to participate in, form, and negotiate measures for close cross-strait exchanges.” The “Soong-Hu Communiqué” also echoes this as: “To expand cross-strait people-to-people exchanges to offer greater convenience to the people on both sides of the Strait.”; “To expand the cross-strait exchange of human resources.”; “To gather together the wisdom and experience of experts, scholars, and outstanding youth on both sides of the Strait into a Cross-Strait Civil Elite Forum, pooling their knowledge and discussing policy suggestions for the development of cross-strait relations.”

Subparagraph 2 of Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the “Anti-Separation Law” reads: “To encourage and facilitate economic exchanges and cooperation, realize direct links of trade, mail and air and shipping services, and bring about closer economic ties between the two sides of the Straits to their mutual benefit.” The “Lien-Hu Communiqué” echoes this wording as: “To promote comprehensive cross-strait economic exchange; establish mechanisms for cross-strait economic cooperation to open up comprehensive economic cooperation, establish close economic and trade relations, including the comprehensive, direct, bidirectional Three Links; open direct air-and waterways; increase the flow and guarantee of investment and trade; engage in cooperation in agriculture and fishing; solve problems of Taiwanese agricultural product sales in the mainland; improve law and order in exchange, .... establish stable mechanisms for economic cooperation; and make the cross-strait common market issue a top priority for discussions after promoting the resumption of cross-strait negotiations.”

The “Soong-Hu Communiqué” echoes this as well, calling for the two sides to:

“Actively promote cross-strait flights;...working, towards comprehensive, direct, bidirectional flights by 2006”; “Promote the realization of direct cross-strait trade and banking, thus further working towards the normalization of cross-strait economic and trade relations”; “(3)To urge the resumption of cross-strait negotiations, engage in negotiations for long-term, stable mechanisms to make cross-strait trade more convenient and liberalized (a cross-strait free trade zone)”; “To increase cross-strait agricultural cooperation, expand investment in agriculture by Taiwanese businessmen, and increase the sales of Taiwanese agricultural products in the mainland.”; “To promote direct, bidirectional, cross-strait business investment; promote concrete cross-strait cooperation in service industries such as banking, insurance, securities, shipping, and medicine; and to promote comprehensive cross-strait economic cooperation, and establish stable mechanisms for cross-strait economic and trade cooperation.”

Subparagraph 3 of Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the “Anti-Separation Law” reads: “To encourage and facilitate cross-strait exchanges in education, science, technology, culture, health and sports, and work together to carry forward the proud Chinese cultural traditions.” The “Lien-Hu Communiqué” and the “Soong-Hu Communiqué” do not contain any corresponding wording. However, the “Soong-Hu Communiqué” does contain the wording: “To expand the cross-strait exchange of human resources.” The “Lien-Hu Communiqué” calls for the establishment of a regular forum for equal communication between the KMT and the CPC to “invite people from all walks of life to participate in, form, negotiate measures for close cross-strait exchange.” However, the purpose in both cases is not to “work together to carry forward the proud Chinese cultural traditions.”

Subparagraph 4 of Paragraph 1, Article 6, the “Anti-Separation Law” states: “To encourage and facilitate cross-strait cooperation in combating crimes.” The “Lien-Hu Communiqué” echoes this wording by urging both sides to “improve law and order in exchange, collectively combatting crime.” The “Soong-Hu Communiqué” does not address this subject.

Subparagraph 5 of Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the “Anti-Separation Law” states: “To encourage and facilitate other activities that are conducive to peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and stronger cross-Straits relations.” Although the “Lien-Hu Communiqué” and the “Soong-Hu Communiqué” contain no wording corresponding to this Subparagraph, the “Lien-Hu Communiqué” urges both sides to “promote the good, healthy development of cross-strait relations”; and the “Soong-Hu Communiqué” mentions “working together to defend peace and security in the Taiwan Strait and

ensuring the peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations.” However, all of these issues are addressed under the precondition of the “1992 Consensus” and only exist once both sides of the Strait resume equal negotiations or talks.

Paragraph 2, Article 7 of the “Anti-Separation Law” stipulates that: “The two sides of the Taiwan Straits may consult and negotiate on the following matters: (1) officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides; (2) mapping out the development of cross-straits relations; (3) steps and arrangements for peaceful national reunification; (4) the political status of the Taiwan authorities; (5) the Taiwan region’s room of international operation that is compatible with its status; and (6) other matters concerning the achievement of peaceful national reunification.” The corresponding sections of the “Lien-Hu Communiqué” and the “Soong-Hu Communiqué” are concentrated on the issues of “officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides,” “mapping out the development of cross-strait relations” and “the Taiwan region’s room of international operation that is compatible with its status.” The corresponding text of the “Lien-Hu Communiqué” is: “Officially end the state of hostility between the two sides, reach a peace agreement, and build a framework for the peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations, including establishing military mutual confidence-building measures and avoiding cross-strait military conflicts”; “To discuss the issue of Taiwan’s international participation, which the Taiwanese people care about, after resuming cross-strait negotiations, with Taiwan’s participation in WHO activities as a top priority.”

The corresponding text of the “Soong-Hu Communiqué” reads: “Both sides should officially end the state of hostility between the two sides through consultations and negotiations, reach a peace agreement in the future, and establish cross-strait military mutual confidence-building measures, working together to defend peace and security in the Taiwan Strait, and ensuring the peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations”; “To discuss the issue of Taiwan’s international participation, which the Taiwanese people care about, after resuming cross-strait negotiations, with Taiwan’s participation in WHO as a top priority.”

Analysis of the above content clearly shows the correlation between the “Lien-Hu Communiqué” and the “Soong-Hu Communiqué” as well as the “Anti-Separation Law.” Analyzed in terms of their timing, the “Anti-Separation Law” preceded the “Lien-Hu Communiqué” and the “Soong-Hu Communiqué.” Therefore, judging from the content of the “one law, two communiqués,” it can be said that in fact the “Lien-Hu Communiqué” and the “Soong-Hu Communiqué” both echo and implement the

“Anti-Separation Law.”

Table 3-1: A Comparison of the Anti-Secession Law to the Lien-Hu and Soong-Hu Communiqués

Anti-Secession Law	Lien-Hu Communiqué	Soong-Hu Communiqué
<p>Article 1 – This Law is formulated, in accordance with the Constitution, for the purpose of opposing and checking Taiwan’s secession from China by secessionists in the name of “Taiwan independence,” promoting peaceful national reunification, maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, preserving China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation.</p> <p>Article 2– There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots</p>	<p>Section 1, Article 1 – It is the common position of the CCP and the KMT to uphold the 1992 Consensus, oppose Taiwan independence, strive for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, urge the development of cross-strait relations, and protect the interests of the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.</p> <p>Section 1, Article 2– Urging cross- strait exchange and interaction and collectively honoring Chinese culture will help to dispel misunderstandings, increase mutual confidence, and build consensus.</p> <p>Section 1, Article 3– Peace and development are major trends of the twenty-first century. The peaceful development of cross-strait relations serves the interests of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, as well as the interests of the Asia-Pacific region and the world.</p>	<p>Article 1– To promote the swift resumption of equal cross-strait negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus.</p> <p>The consensus reached by both sides of the Strait in 1992 should be respected (transcription of the oral remarks made by both sides at the 1992 meeting: SEF—“As both sides of the Taiwan Strait collectively work for national reunification, while both sides uphold the one China principle, each has a different interpretation of one China.” ARATS—“Both sides of the Taiwan Strait uphold the one China principle and work together for national reunification, but cross-strait negotiations have not touched upon the political meaning of one China.”)</p> <p>On the basis described above, in which both sides of the Taiwan Strait express support for the one China principle, namely the “two sides, one China”</p>

<p>included.</p> <p>Taiwan is part of China. The state shall never allow the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means.</p> <p>Article 3 –The Taiwan question is one that is left over from China’s civil war of the late 1940s.</p> <p>Solving the Taiwan question and achieving national reunification is China’s internal affair, which subjects to no interference by any outside forces.</p> <p>Article 4 – accomplishing the great task of reunifying the motherland is the sacred duty of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included.</p> <p>Article 5– Upholding the principle of one China is the basis of peaceful reunification of the country.</p> <p>To reunify the country through peaceful means best serves the fundamental interests of the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan</p>		<p>interpretation of the 1992 Consensus, both sides will work to quickly resume negotiations, respect each other, seek common ground while maintaining differences, and seek pragmatic solutions to the major issues that concern both sides.</p> <p>Article 2– Resolutely oppose Taiwan independence and work together for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.</p> <p>Taiwan independence attempts to damage cross-strait feelings of kinship, is harmful to the development of normal, mutually beneficial, cooperative relations between Taiwan and the mainland, and more importantly, attempts to destroy security and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides resolutely oppose any promotion of Taiwan independence activities designed to destroy the status quo, such as “clarification of national titles” or “introducing a new constitution through referendum.”</p> <p>The PRC hopes that the leaders of Taiwan will be</p>
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<p>Straits. The state shall do its utmost with maximum sincerity to achieve a peaceful reunification.</p> <p>After the country is reunified peacefully, Taiwan may practice systems different from those on the mainland and enjoy a high degree of autonomy.</p> <p>Article 6 – The state shall take the following measures to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and promote cross-Straits relations:</p> <p>(1) to encourage and facilitate personnel exchanges across the Straits for greater mutual understanding and mutual trust;</p> <p>(2) to encourage and facilitate economic exchanges and cooperation, realize direct links of trade, mail and air and shipping services, and bring about closer economic ties between the two sides of the Straits to their mutual benefit;</p>		<p>realistic and carry out the Four Noes and One Without pledge reaffirmed on February 24, as well as the pledge not promote Taiwan de jure independence through constitutional reform. A cross-strait military conflict can only be effectively avoided as long as there is no possibility that Taiwan's development will move it in the direction of Taiwan independence.</p>
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<p>(3) to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits exchanges in education, science, technology, culture, health and sports, and work together to carry forward the proud Chinese cultural traditions;</p> <p>(4)to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits cooperation in combating crimes; and</p> <p>(5)to encourage and facilitate other activities that are conducive to peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits relations.</p> <p>Article 7 – The state stands for the achievement of peaceful reunification through consultations and negotiations on an equal footing between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. These consultations and negotiations may be conducted in steps and phases and with flexible and varied modalities.</p> <p>The two sides of the Taiwan Straits may consult and negotiate on the following matters:</p> <p>(1) officially ending</p>	<p>Section 2, Article 3 –</p> <p>To promote comprehensive cross-strait economic exchange ; establish mechanisms for cross-strait economic cooperation to open up comprehensive economic cooperation, establish close economic and trade relations, including the comprehensive, direct, bidirectional Three Links; open direct air-and waterways; increase the flow and guarantee of investment and trade; engage in cooperation in agriculture and fishing; solve problems of Taiwanese agricultural</p>	<p>Article 4 –Strengthen cross-strait economic and trade exchange; promote the establishment of stable mechanisms for cross-strait economic and trade cooperation. Cross-strait integration is mutually beneficial, whereas cross-strait separation is harmful; exchange benefits both sides. Both sides are willing to promote real cross-strait economic exchange, and to open up cross-strait relations characterized by positive interaction, on the basis of mutually beneficial cooperation.</p>
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<p>the state of hostility between the two sides;</p> <p>(2) mapping out the development of cross-Straits relations;</p> <p>(3) steps and arrangements for peaceful national reunification;</p> <p>(4) the political status of the Taiwan authorities;</p> <p>(5) the Taiwan region's room of international operation that is compatible with its status; and</p> <p>(6) other matters concerning the achievement of peaceful national reunification.</p>	<p>product sales in the mainland; improve law and order in exchange, collectively combating crime; establish stable mechanisms for economic cooperation; and make the collective market issue a top priority for discussions after promoting the resumption of cross-strait negotiations.</p> <p>Section 2, Article 5 – To establish an regular forum for equal communication between the CCP and the KMT, including mutual visits between party members of different ranks, in order to discuss ways to improve cross-strait relations and engage in negotiations regarding issues that relate to the personal interests of compatriots on both sides of the Strait; and to invite people from all walks of life to participate in, form, and negotiate measures for close cross-strait exchanges.</p> <p>Section 2, Article 1 – To promote the swift resumption of cross-strait negotiations in order to work together for the well-being of people on both sides of the Strait; to promote the swift resumption of equal cross-strait negotiations on</p>	<p>(1) Actively promote cross-strait flights; urge a successful charter-flight model by Chinese New Year in 2005; achieve holiday and regular passenger charter flights and promote measures for convenient cargo flights, working, towards comprehensive, direct, bidirectional flights by 2006;</p> <p>(2) To promote direct cross-strait trade and banking; promote the realization of direct cross-strait trade and banking, thus further working towards the normalization of cross-strait economic and trade relations;</p> <p>(3) To urge the resumption of cross-strait negotiations, engage in negotiations for long-term, stable mechanisms to make cross-strait trade more convenient and liberalized (a cross-strait free trade zone)</p> <p>(4) To increase cross-strait agricultural cooperation, expand investment in agriculture by Taiwanese businessmen, and increase the sales of Taiwanese agricultural products in the mainland. The mainland will offer customs exemptions, inspections, quarantining, and tax exemptions for certain</p>
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	<p>the basis of the 1992 Consensus to discuss issues that both sides are collectively and individually concerned with; to promote the good, healthy development of cross-strait relations.</p> <p>Section 2, Article 2 – Officially end the state of hostility between the two sides, reach a peace agreement, and build a framework for the peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations, including establishing military mutual confidence-building measures and avoid cross-strait military conflicts.</p> <p>Section 2, Article 4 – Discuss the issue of Taiwan’s international participation, which the Taiwanese people care about, after resuming cross-strait negotiations, with Taiwan’s participation in WHO activities as a top priority. Both sides will work together to create conditions for seeking a final solution.</p>	<p>agricultural products (fruit) in order to assist in solving the problem of poor sales of Taiwanese agricultural products during harvest season. Taiwan will ship the products (fruit).</p> <p>(5) To promote direct, bidirectional, cross-strait business investment; promote concrete cross-strait cooperation in service industries such as banking, insurance, securities, shipping, and medicine; and to promote comprehensive cross-strait economic cooperation, and establish stable mechanisms for cross-strait economic and trade cooperation.</p> <p>(6) To promote negotiations to resolve issues regarding the interests of Taiwanese investors, on the basis of mutual benefit.</p> <p>(7) To expand cross-strait people-to-people exchanges to offer greater convenience to the people on both sides of the Strait. The mainland will simplify the procedures for the Taiwanese compatriots to enter the mainland.</p> <p>(8) The mainland will offer the same tuition standards to Taiwanese students studying in the mainland as it does to</p>
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		<p>mainlander students, and it will create a scholarship for Taiwanese students within this year.</p> <p>(9) To expand the cross-strait exchange of human resources. The mainland will relax its policies to encourage Taiwanese compatriots to study in the mainland.</p> <p>Article 6– To promote the establishment of the Cross-Strait Civil Elite Forum and service mechanisms for Taiwanese businessmen; to gather together the wisdom and experience of experts, scholars, and outstanding youth on both sides of the Strait into a Cross-Strait Civil Elite Forum, pooling their knowledge and discussing policy suggestions for the development of cross-strait relations. Both sides will work together to promote the establishment and perfection of service mechanisms for Taiwanese businessmen.</p> <p>Article 1– To promote the swift resumption of equal cross-strait negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus.</p> <p>Article 3– Both sides should officially end the state of hostility between the two</p>
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		<p>sides through consultations and negotiations, reach a peace agreement in the future, and establish cross-strait military mutual confidence-building measures, working together to defend peace and security in the Taiwan Strait and ensuring the peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations.</p> <p>Article 5–To engage in negotiations regarding the issue of Taiwan’s international participation, which the Taiwanese people care about, after resuming cross-strait negotiations, with Taiwan’s participation in WHO activities as a top priority. Both sides will work together, seeking common ground while maintaining differences, to find a final solution.</p>
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Source: Adapted from the Anti-Secession Law, the Lien-Hu Communiqué, the Soong-Hu Communiqué

**(3) The “one law, two communiqués” framework has become the shackle enchaining the destiny of the Taiwanese people**

When Lien Chan and James Soong met with Hu Jintao in Beijing, neither of them was a leader of a ruling party, the so-called “press communiqué on the meeting consensus” therefore should not have any binding force on the Taiwanese people. However, with recent developments, the “one law, two communiqués” framework has become a new shackle on Taiwan. For example, the “Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Forum” held in

Beijing in April 2005, was originally to be convened at the end of 2005 in Taipei. It was later relocated to Beijing due to opposition from the Taiwanese government. Jia Qinglin, chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), stated in his opening address that, "This forum is held to carry out the important measures that have been included in the press communiqué of the meeting between President Hu Jintao and KMT Chairman Lien Chan last year." After the meeting, Chen Yunlin, director of Taiwan Affairs Office under Beijing's State Council, was authorized to announce 15 preferential measures for Taiwan. He stated that, "[China] has adopted a series of measures to actively carrying out the various consensus items reached during the meeting between President Hu and Chairman Lien in April last year." He also stated that, "[China] will exert the utmost effort and deal thoroughly with any matters that are beneficial to the peaceful unification of the motherland." These statements made by Beijing's high-ranking officials responsible for Taiwan policy amply illustrate that the Beijing-led "Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Forum" was held entirely to carry out the "one law, two communiqués." Moreover, among the Taiwanese businesspeople attending the forum there was no lack of so-called "green Taiwanese businesspeople" who openly supported the DPP government. When the TV cameras panned to them, their attitude was clearly embarrassing and evasive, indicating that, in consideration of their commercial interests, as with the reaction of Hsu Wen-long in the "Hsu Wen-long Incident," they had no choice but to subject themselves to this kind of a new shackle.

Another example is an incident involving the KMT's placement of an advertisement in the February 15, 2006, edition of the *Liberty Times*, stating that "Taiwan independence" is also an option for the future of the Taiwanese people. After the Beijing authorities heard this news, they immediately expressed strong dissatisfaction to the KMT Central Committee through the "KMT-CPC Platform" previously established between the two sides. They believed that the position stated in the advertisement violated the communiqué of the "Lien-Hu Meeting" and demanded that the KMT "give an explanation." They forced the KMT into modifying its statement to say that "Taiwan independence" is just the freedom of speech of the Taiwanese people and that the KMT has not changed from its position of firmly opposing "Taiwan independence." This is just one clear example.

## **2. China's implementation of the "Anti-Separation Law"**

### **(1) Escalating military intimidation:**

China has never renounced the use of force against Taiwan. It has used Article 8 of the ASL as an excuse to intimidate the Taiwanese people and to threaten to attack Taiwan by

“non-peaceful” means. In the three years since the ASL was passed, China has rapidly expanded its military spending and military deployment by making the excuse of the need to strengthen its military preparations targeting Taiwan. Its national defense budget, moreover, has been growing at a double-digit pace for 19 consecutive years. In March 2008, the Chinese National People’s Congress announced that the national defense budget for 2008 was 417.769 billion renminbi, an increase of 17.6% from the year before. China has deployed one-third of its forces and over 1,000 missiles targeting Taiwan (President Chen stated in his 2008 New Year’s Message that the number of missiles has increased to 1,328, while the U.S. Department of Defense’s *2008 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic China* places the figure between 990 and 1,070 missiles). Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan and other officials have also emphasized on several official occasions and in interactions with US officials the importance of enforcing the ASL. At the First Session of China’s 11th National People’s Congress (NPC) and the First Session of the 11th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) this year, Guo Boxiong, a high ranking officer of the People’s Liberation Army, emphasized China’s military preparations targeting Taiwan. The rapid rise and development of China’s military, including weapons, military spending, and space and network attack capabilities, have aroused concern among the United States, Japan, European Union and other major countries.

## **(2) Intensifying diplomatic suppression:**

The SAL emphasizes that “There is only one China in the world and Taiwan is part of China.” Since the implementation of this law, China has thoroughly put this advocacy into practice in its diplomatic activities and has suppressed Taiwan more peremptorily than ever before, reaching an unprecedented degree. The Beijing authorities have used political, diplomatic, economic and trade bargaining chips to successively lure or coerce Senegal, Chad, Costa Rica, and Malawi to break off diplomatic ties with Taiwan; they have blocked and suppressed the motions that have been submitted for Taiwan’s participation in the WHO and the United Nations; they have maneuvered to change Taiwan’s formal name that Taiwan has used for participation in international activities; and they have interfered with the transit itinerary of the Taiwanese president and high-ranking officials on overseas trips. According to statistics compiled by the Mainland Affairs Council, China has exerted diplomatic suppression against Taiwan in over 120 incidents since it passed the ASL (for related contents please refer to the appendix on “*Examples of China’s Suppression of Taiwan in the International Arena over Recent Years*”). In recent years, China has also

continued to strengthen its strategy of “detering Taiwan by exerting external pressures.” It has used international cooperation, dialogue and other mechanisms to highlight its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan and to emphasize the content of the ASL including “one China,” “anti-Taiwan independence,” “peaceful unification,” and others. Due to China’s rising position in the international community, more than 160 countries have been forced to recognize China’s sovereignty over Taiwan and oppose “Taiwan independence.” China’s attempts at suppressing Taiwan’s international personality and Taiwan’s space for survival and development in the international arena have already had a serious impact.

### **(3) Denigrating Taiwan’s democratic development and maliciously changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait:**

China has always viewed Taiwan’s democratic activities as steps toward “Taiwan independence.” It has rejected and ignored the democratic achievements and the trend of public opinion in Taiwan, and it has taken an extremely hard-line attitude toward Taiwan’s sovereignty. According to the ASL, China continues to emphasize firm adherence to the “one China” principle and to oppose and deter what it unilaterally presumes to be actions to seek “*de jure* Taiwan independence,” imposing an extremely narrow framework on Taiwan’s democratization efforts. It lumps together the Taiwanese government’s promotion of “constitutional reform,” “rectification of names,” “referendum on joining the UN” and other actions to deepen democracy in Taiwan as “Taiwan independence” separatist activities. In addition to issuing hard-line statements to threaten and criticize these activities, China has not only joined with opposition forces in Taiwan in impeding the Taiwanese government from exercising its powers, but has also mobilized international forces to exert pressure on Taiwan. It has also intentionally released the message to the outside world that Taiwan is touching or crossing the red line drawn by the ASL, while loudly threatening to adopt preventive and deterrent measures by all conceivable means. Furthermore, in addition to passing a “Sudden Incident Response Law” in 2007, the Beijing authorities have also planned to deliberate on a “National Defense Mobilization Law.” Through the preventive action of integrating newly-implemented and existing laws, China attempts to incorporate Taiwan into the applicable scope of its national emergency response measures. Its objective in doing so is to establish a complete legal framework for “opposing independence” so as to further “internalize” Taiwan as one province of the PRC. Moreover, at the end of 2007, China established a new air route west of the median of the Taiwan Strait, unilaterally emphasizing that the Taiwan Strait is part of the internal waters of China. Through this move, China has also not only intensified its military threats against

Taiwan, but it has also seriously endangered the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

**(4) Using united front tactics to divide Taiwanese society:**

Over the past three years, China has used the two-pronged “carrot-and-stick tactics” in its united front strategy against Taiwan in accordance with the “Anti-Separation Law.” It also has actively implemented the principle of “placing hopes on the Taiwanese people” and the soft-handed tactics of “providing benefits” in its Taiwan work, which is aimed at wooing the Taiwanese people by alienating the government from the governed and gradually achieving its objective of “entering the island, entering the home, and entering the mind.” After implementing the ASL, China successively formed contacts with Taiwan’s opposition parties, while also unilaterally releasing Taiwan policy measures aimed at catering to the individual demands of specific groups in Taiwan, in an attempt to nationalize and internalize related industries in Taiwan on the one hand, while, on the other hand, also strengthening its external image of “peaceful development.” Disregarding the government authority of Taiwan’s democratically-elected government, China has continued to use opposition parties and civilian organizations in Taiwan to promote specific issues and pressure the Taiwanese government. It has also set up political preconditions and frameworks to interfere with negotiations on cross-strait issues, while shifting the responsibility for the delay of negotiations onto Taiwan. At the same time, the Beijing authorities have stepped up their united front work toward local governments and offshore island counties and cities to drive a wedge into Taiwan’s society, while falsely claiming that the Taiwanese government and national leader are the stumbling blocks obstructing and undermining cross-strait relations.

**3. Dangers of the “one law, two communiqués” for Taiwan**

Lien Chan, James Soong and Hu Jintao concluded “two communiqués,” building a new framework for China in its Taiwan work. This framework poses the danger of allowing China to economically absorb Taiwan gradually and achieve *de facto* unification and *de jure* annexation of Taiwan. The main dangers of the “one law, two communiqués” for Taiwan include the following:

**(1) Smuggling in the “one China principle” by the “1992 Consensus” to sell out Taiwan’s sovereignty**

The “Lien-Hu Communiqué” and the “Soong-Hu Communiqué,” along with previous KMT-CPC Forums, not only have not demanded that the Beijing authorities accept the so-called “1992 Consensus” on “one China, with each side having its own interpretation.” On the contrary, they have provided Beijing with the “1992 Consensus” with which Beijing can not only package its “one China principle” via a backdoor listing, but it can also use the “1992 Consensus” to “smuggle” in its “one China principle.” It is patently clear that the “two communiqués” were intended to endorse the Beijing authorities’ definition of the “one China principle” and their Taiwan policy. Ultimately, they will sell out Taiwan’s sovereign position to China.

## **(2) Requiring Taiwan to “negotiate” with China on Taiwan’s participation in international activities**

Based on the 1992 Consensus on the “one China” principle, Article 7 of the ASL and both the “Lien-Hu Communiqué” and the “Soong-Hu Communiqué” clearly state the intention in the future to “engage in negotiations regarding the issue of Taiwan’s international participation, which the Taiwanese people care about. To discuss the issue of Taiwan’s international participation, which the Taiwanese people care about, after resuming cross-strait negotiations, with Taiwan’s participation in WHO activities as a top priority. Both sides will work together to create conditions for seeking a final resolution.” In short, the “two communiqués” accept a political arrangement in which Taiwan is not an independent sovereign country. Even if Taiwan wants to participate in international organizations, it must negotiate with Beijing and can only join important international organizations with Beijing’s approval.

Therefore, China has of course interpreted Taiwan’s “referendum on joining the UN” as “*de jure* Taiwan independence” and mobilized its integrated national power to activate global resources for the purpose of obstructing the “referendum on joining the UN.” With regard to the KMT’s proposed “referendum on returning to the UN,” China has used the “two communiqués” to pressure the KMT and finally to force the KMT to retreat from its position on the referendum.

## **(3) Covering up China’s military threats to alleviate international pressure on China**

China’s unilateral enactment of the “Anti-Separation Law” in March 2005 triggered tensions in the Taiwan Strait. When various countries voiced due support for Taiwan and criticized China for unilaterally changing the status quo in the Strait, China used the “Lien-Hu Communiqué” and the “Soong-Hu Communiqué” and subsequent KMT-CPC

forums as evidence in its favor. Beijing has issued a position paper on the “Anti-Separation Law,” in which Beijing used the visits to China by Lien Chan and James Soong and the content of the “Lien-Hu Communiqué” and the “Soong-Hu Communiqué” to cover up China’s military threats against Taiwan, to alleviate international pressure on China, and to justify its enactment of the “Anti-Separation Law.”

For example, on the day when Lien Chan visited China (April 29, 2005), representatives of the Chinese military held the 7th Sino-US defense consultative talk with the representatives of the U.S. Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Department of State in Washington, D.C. Facing strong US opposition to China’s implementation of the ASL for creating tension in the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese government went so far as to mention the visits by KMT Chairman Lien Chan and PFP Chairman James Soong to refute international pressure over the ASL. After the seventh Sino-US defense consultative talk, China’s military representatives stated that: “The two sides have discussed China’s ‘Anti-Separation Law.’ China has clearly stated that the ‘Anti-Separation Law’ is not an order to mobilize for war, but rather a law to promote peaceful unification. Since the passage of this law, there have not been tensions in the Taiwan Strait. On the contrary, the situation is developing toward moderation. This trend is exhibited in the mainland visits by Lien Chan and James Soong.”

#### **(4) Accelerating Taiwan’s economic reliance on China and establishing a cross-strait common market**

In the three years after the Lien-Hu meeting in 2005, on the basis of the consensus in the “Lien-Hu Communiqué,” the KMT and the CPC held two cross-strait economic and trade forums (the KMT-CPC Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Forum on April 15, 2006; and the KMT-CPC Cross-Strait Economic, Trade and Cultural Forum on April 16, 2007), and one cross-strait agricultural forum (the KMT-CPC Cross-Strait Agricultural Cooperation Forum on October 17, 2006), in which the KMT and the CPC not only proposed that both sides across the Strait should first implement a cross-strait common market, but they also reached a consensus on various areas of economic, trade and agricultural cooperation. The Chinese side also used the KMT-CPC economic and trade forum as a platform to unilaterally announce several “preferential policies,” which was to divide and lure the Taiwanese society so as to completely destroy Taiwanese psychological defenses. Under such circumstances, the number of Taiwanese businesspeople investing in China has increased drastically, which has thus exacerbated Taiwan’s economic dependence on China. The KMT, on the other hand, has used the content of the consensus

reached at the KMT-CPC forum to persistently coerce the government into further relaxing Taiwan's economic and trade policies on a large scale in preparation for the future establishment of a cross-strait common market.

**(5) Misleading the Taiwanese agricultural industry to go west to China and inflicting heavy damages on Taiwan's agricultural and fishing sectors**

Under the guidance of the "one law, two communiqués," the KMT-CPC held a "Cross-Strait Agricultural Forum" to jointly promote several agricultural cooperation projects. The forum was also held in coordination with the Chinese government's planning and establishment of cross-strait agricultural pioneer parks, cross-strait agricultural cooperation experimental zones, and cross-strait forestry cooperation experimental zones in various cities and provinces. These projects were designed to attract Taiwanese capital and technology to China and lead to the wholesale transfer and copying of Taiwan's agricultural experience and technology, which has resulted in the large-scale outflow of Taiwan's major agricultural technology and precious seeds. Already, China's counterfeiting and trademark infringement of Taiwanese agricultural products, and mainlanders' trademark registration of names such as Alishan Tea, Dongding Oolong, Yujing Mangoes, Pingtung Black Pearl Wax Apples, and Hsinchu Rice Flour Noodles, have enabled China's agricultural and fishery products to seize the international market share originally occupied by Taiwanese agricultural products and to challenge Taiwan's position in agricultural technology. If these products are exported back to Taiwan in the future, they will heavily damage Taiwan's agricultural and fishing industries.

**4. Conclusion**

The consequences resulting from China's comprehensive promotion of the "one law, two communiqués" have undoubtedly produced structural influences on security in the Taiwan Strait, restricting and undermining the development of cross-strait relations. Politically, Beijing will absolutely not change or relax its "one China" position; militarily, China will not lessen its intimidation against Taiwan, nor will it take the initiative to withdraw the missiles deployed against Taiwan; and economically, China will continue to exert its magnetic effect and further promote its opening-up measures; however, its political purposes cannot be neglected.

In order to ensure Taiwan's sustainable development, we should specially insist on Taiwan's sovereign status and adhere consistently to using "democracy and peace" as the main theme for the development of cross-strait relations, so as to resolve cross-strait

differences through dialogue and to continue creating opportunities for benign interactions in the course of developing cross-strait relations. We further urge the international community that it should, for the sake of peaceful and stable development in the Taiwan Strait, continue expressing concern about the changing situation in the Taiwan Strait following China's passage of the ASL as well as the possible crisis resulting from China's use of force against Taiwan. As such, the international community should take more positive measures to deter China's military expansion in the Taiwan Strait so as to safeguard the democratic development in Taiwan and jointly maintain permanent peace in the Taiwan Strait and Asia-Pacific region.

Appendix: Examples of China's Suppression of Taiwan in the International Arena over Recent Years

Examples of China's Suppression of Taiwan in the International  
Arena over Recent Years  
Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan  
March 14, 2008

Date	Incident
January 2005	China lures Grenada through financial assistance (about US\$100 million and reconstruction of Grenada's national sports stadium) to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
January 2005	To comment on President Chen Shui-bian's transit stopover in Guam, China's Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Kong Quan states that China firmly opposes any country, especially countries with diplomatic relations with China, agreeing to transits by President Chen Shui-bian.
January 19-23, 2005	At the XXIX Pigeon Racing Olympiad of 2005 held by the Fédération Colombophile Internationale (FCI) in Portugal, Chinese representatives express objection to allowing the Taiwan team to bring its national flag to the competition venue. After their demand is rejected, the Chinese team forcibly snatches away Taiwan's national flag.

March 2005	After passing the "anti-separation law," (ASL) China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues a diplomatic notice pressuring more than 60 countries, including Vanuatu, Tanzania, Cuba, Azerbaijan, and Madagascar, to express criticism of Taiwan and support for the ASL.
March 2005	Taiwan's original membership name in the Asia Pacific Association of Agricultural Research Institutions (APAARI) was the Council of Agriculture (COA, Taiwan). Under pressure from China, the APAARI Executive Secretary Raj Paroda sent a letter in July 2004 requesting that Taiwan change its membership name to "Chinese Taipei" or "Taipei China." After Taiwan firmly rejected the change, the APAARI exerted pressure on Taiwan by changing the venue of its eighth General Assembly from Taipei to Bangkok, Thailand. In March 2005, the APAARI Executive Committee unilaterally changes Taiwan's membership name to COA (Chinese Taipei) in violation of the APAARI's position as a nonpolitical organization.
Early April 2005	The Australian Automotive Aftermarket Association (AAAA), sponsor of the AAAA Trade Show, announces that the billboard at the show entrance will feature the exhibiting countries and their flags, including the flag of Taiwan, which is to be presented side by side with those of the United States, Japan, and China. Moreover, a large banner and billboard with the word "Taiwan" will be erected at the area for Taiwan exhibitors. Chinese Consulate-General in Sydney is intensely dissatisfied and lodges a protest with the sponsor demanding that Taiwan's flag be removed from the billboard. Consulate officials also deliver a letter of protest from Consul General Qiu Shaofang to the show venue demanding that the sponsor meet with him and take responsibility for settling this matter.
Early April 2005	Vice President Yeh Ching-lung of the National Teachers' Association ROC and three others go to France to attend the "EI Conference on GATS and Education" that takes place in Paris on April 4-5, 2005. During the conference, China's representative to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) demands that the

	<p>UNESCO General Conference prohibit Taiwan's representatives from entering the UN headquarters to attend the meeting. After the UNESCO secretary-general speaks on behalf of the Taiwan representatives and issues a warning, the representatives are finally able to attend the meeting.</p>
Late April 2005	<p>The ROC embassy to the Dominican Republic is invited to attend the opening ceremony of the Santo Domingo International Book Fair in the Dominican Republic. After the ceremony, Cai Wei-quan, China's commercial representative in the Dominican Republic asks fair staff to place a PRC name plaque and tabletop PRC flag at Taiwan's exhibition booth, intending to disrupt Taiwan's participation in the activity.</p>
May 4-6, 2005	<p>The "World Health Organization (WHO) Conference on the Health Aspects of the Tsunami Disaster in Asia" is held in Phuket, Thailand. A six-member delegation from Taiwan, including Dr. Ming-Jer Tsai, head of the Department of Emergency Medicine at National Cheng Kung University Hospital, attends the conference in the capacity of "participants." China places intensive pressure to prevent the Taiwanese delegates from attending the opening ceremony.</p>
Early 2005	<p>Ten days before the opening of the World Health Assembly (WHA), the Chinese delegation sends an official diplomatic note to the Geneva delegations of Taiwan's allies, using untruthful language to again distort the importance and legitimacy of Taiwan's application to become a WHA observer and substantively participate in the International Health Regulations (IHR), and demands that Taiwan's allies not support the application. On May 14, China and the World Health Organization (WHO) Secretary General sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU); and on May 27, the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention faxes a portion of the MOU to the director of Taiwan's Centers for Disease Control. The MOU refers to Taiwan as "Taiwan, China" and declares that the WHO must first consult with China before conducting technical exchanges with Taiwan. Taiwan demands that the contents of the MOU be made public, but does not succeed.</p>

May 25, 2005	Council of Labor Affairs Chairwoman Chen Chu leads a delegation to participate in the 38th WorldSkills Competition in Finland. Due to China's deliberate suppression, the host country issues an official letter notifying that Taiwan will not be permitted to use its national flag at the competition.
June 2005	At the 4th Asia Security Conference held by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), China makes a demand to the sponsor that the "four noes" should serve as a precondition for sending representatives to attend the conference. These include: not allowing participation by an official Taiwanese delegation; not allowing Taiwan's formal participation in discussions; not allowing Taiwanese delegation to attend the evening banquet; and not allowing Taiwanese delegation to make informal contact with the delegations of other countries. In addition, the name list of Taiwanese scholars is placed last in the list of conference participants under the heading of "IISS Members and Guests."
Early June 2005	Under pressure from China, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Secretariat omits the official titles (such as Counselor, First Secretary, Second Secretary and Third Secretary) of the members of Taiwan's Permanent Mission to the WTO, except for the titles of the Permanent Representative and Deputy Permanent Representative, in the newly published WTO members directory. The directory entries include only the names and duties of the officials.
Late July 2005	Taiwan's ambassador to the Dominican Republic John Feng and China's Commercial Representative in the Dominican Republic Cai Weiwan are invited at the same time to attend a groundbreaking ceremony at the Chinatown district of the capital Santo Domingo. Cai's staff arrives early at the event and stubbornly occupies the seats of honor for the diplomatic corps. Event personnel try three times to vacate the seats, to no avail. The matter is finally resolved after Ambassador Feng negotiates with the sponsor to get back the seats for Taiwan's delegation members.
August 2005	According to a report in Switzerland's Neue Zurcher Zeitung, the Chinese embassy in Switzerland protests to the Swiss

	<p>Federal Department of Foreign Affairs over a visit to Taiwan in August by the president of the Swiss Council of States. Wang Yanmin, the spokesperson for the Chinese embassy, expresses strong dissatisfaction to the Swiss government and states that countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China are not permitted to have any kind of contact with Taiwanese official.</p>
August 2005	<p>Due to manipulation by China, Taiwan is barred from displaying its national flag at the World Masters Games in Edmonton, Canada.</p>
August 12, 2005	<p>China's United Nations (UN) ambassador Wang Guangya issues a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan protesting motions by Taiwan's allies in support of Taiwan's bid to join the UN and a petition urging the UN to help maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait.</p>
September 2005	<p>In response to transit stops by President Chen Shui-bian in the United States (US) and United Arab Emirates (UAE) en route to Central America, China seriously takes up the matter with the US and UAE and expresses its strong dissatisfaction. China also clearly states its position to the Indonesian government after Typhoon Longwang forces President Chen's plane to make a provisional stop in Bali.</p>
September 2005	<p>Taiwan's application to become an observer of the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy (IPHE) is originally approved to be discussed at the IPHE's 4th Steering Committee meeting in September 2005 in Kyoto, Japan. However, China raises the condition that IPHE members must be national governmental entities and vigorously opposes Taiwan's motion. It threatens to boycott the meeting if its demands are not accepted. In order to prevent this dispute from affecting the development of the IPHE and the outcome of the meeting, the IPHE Secretariat decides not to consider Taiwan's application.</p>
Mid-September 2005	<p>Fearing Chinese pressure, Syria refuses to provide visas for Taiwan's delegation to the 15th Conference of the Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization Conference (AARDO), of which Taiwan has been a member since 1968. The move</p>

	deprives Taiwan of its participation and voting rights at the conference.
September 2005	Leading a delegation on a visit to Central America, President Chen Shui-bian arrives in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) capital Abu Dhabi on September 30, 2005. At daybreak on October 1, 2005, he talks freely with accompanying reporters on the issues related to Taiwan's diplomatic predicament and relations between Taiwan and the UAE. Because President Chen does not return to Taiwan via San Francisco according to the original itinerary, China raises objections.
October 2005	Taipei and Kaohsiung city delegates to the "2005 Citynet Congress" in Hanoi, Vietnam are prevented from attending the opening and closing ceremonies due to China's pressure.
October 2005	Internet search engine Google obtains an operating license in China and at the same time declares that it identifies with Beijing's "One China" policy. Google's Map Service entitles a map of Taiwan as a "province of China."
October 2005	Due to intense suppression and intimidation by China, Chinese language media in Brunei, including the United Daily News, See Hua Daily News, International Times and Sin Chew Daily, are instructed by their main offices not to publish originally planned special reports on Taiwan's National Day celebrations.
Mid-October 2005	In the capacity of member of the South Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO), Chinese ambassador to Papua New Guinea Li Zhengjun hosts a dinner for all SPTO members. During the dinner he emphasizes that, based on the "one China" policy, the Taiwan issue is a matter of China's internal affairs and China strongly opposes Taiwan's membership in the SPTO. At the 15th SPTO Council of Ministers, China reiterates its firm opposition to Taiwan's membership in the organization.
Mid-October 2005	Chinese ambassador to Canada Lu Shumin issues a warning to the Canadian government stating that if the Canadian parliament approves a bill to establish official economic, trade and cultural relations with Taiwan, it will destroy the basis of Sino-Canadian relations.

October 25, 2005	After having received monetary incentives from China, Senegal announces that it decides to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
October 25, 2005	At the press conference after the “Health Ministers Meeting on Global Pandemic Influenza Readiness,” Chinese Minister of Health Qiang Gao reiterates that Taiwan is not a sovereign country and therefore does not meet the regulations for membership in the World Health Organization.
November 2005	China obstructs participation by Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng as representative of President Chen Shui-bian at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Informal Leaders Summit in Busan, Korea.
November 17, 2005	More than 10 overseas supporters of Taiwan carry ROC flags and vest with ROC flag designs to the venue of the First Asian Indoor Games in Bangkok to root for Taiwanese competitors. China protests to the sponsor and tries several times to interfere. However, overseas Taiwanese involved argue persuasively that they are spectators and not members of the Taiwanese delegation, ultimately preventing China from achieving its scheme to belittle Taiwan.
December 2005	The Australian government rapidly incurs the protest of the Chinese authorities over plans to send the Minister for Education, Science and Training on a visit to Taiwan at the end of 2005. China states that countries maintaining diplomatic relations with it should not send ministers or other high-ranking officials to visit Taiwan, and therefore it strongly opposes the Australian government's sending of ministers to Taiwan for visits.
Late January 2006	China's embassy in Indonesia demands that Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs should not violate the “one China” policy and cannot agree to Taiwan's request to allow its naval fleet to visit Indonesia.
February 13, 2006	Under China’s suppression, the sponsor of the 9th World Firefighters Games in Hong Kong prohibits Taiwanese contestants from bringing their national flag, membership flag and firefighter banners into the game venue, as contestants from other countries are allowed to do so. China also forces

	Taiwan's team to change its name to "China Taipei," making it part of the Chinese delegation. Taiwan vigorously protests the move without effect and finally decides to withdraw from the contest.
February 14-17, 2006	With the world's sixth-largest fishery industry, Taiwan is invited to attend the First International Meeting on the Establishment of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) held in New Zealand. However, due to China's obstruction, discriminatory participation arrangements are made, such as requiring Taiwan to attend the meeting as a "Special Observer" and preventing Taiwan from attending the meeting of delegation heads. As such, Taiwan's delegation withdraws from the meeting after issuing a declaration at the opening ceremony.
Late March 2006	China lodges two demands with the European Union (EU) to suppress Taiwan's diplomatic space: (1) It hopes that EU member countries will refuse Taiwan to hold regional coordination work report meetings and prevent Taiwan's minister of foreign affairs from presiding at the meetings; and (2) It hopes that the EU will block Taiwan's attempts to join the WHO. In other words, Taiwan should not be allowed to join international organizations open only to countries.
April 2006	Taiwan is a major supporter and board member of the International Crisis Group (ICG). However, when China is invited to join the ICG, it not only demands that Taiwan change its membership name to "Chinese Taipei," but also demands that no officials from Taiwan participate in the organization activities.
April 20, 2006	Haiti's newly elected president René Préval indicates to ROC Ambassador Yang his hope that Taiwan send less sensitive officials to attend the May 14 presidential inaugural ceremony. The request is aimed at avoiding China's obstruction at the United Nations (UN) Security Council in August 2006 to the extension of the stationing of UN peacekeeper forces in Haiti, which will affect the stability and development of Haiti.
Early May 2006	The APEC Ministerial Meeting on Avian and Influenza

	<p>Pandemics is held in Vietnam. Vietnam's Ministry of Health originally agrees to the signing of a "Taiwan-Vietnam Memorandum of Cooperation on Prevention of Avian Influenza" between Vietnam's National Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology (NIHE) and Taiwan's Center for Disease Control under the Department of Health at the meeting. However, coercion and suppression from China prevents the two sides from completing the signing formalities.</p>
May 2006	<p>The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) refuses to allow Taiwan to join the organization as a member. The ISO 3166 directory of names of countries and territories lists "Taiwan" as "Taiwan, Province of China" due to Chinese pressure.</p>
May 12, 2006	<p>Under pressure from China, the International Hospital Federation (IHF) deliberates the matter of Taiwan's membership under the name of "Taiwan Hospital Association" (THA) at a meeting of the IHF Governing Council. The IHF not only resolves to change Taiwan's membership name to "Taiwan Hospital Association, China", but it also demands that the THA sign a memorandum that is aimed at belittling the name and position of Taiwan.</p>
May 22, 2006	<p>At the 59th World Health Assembly (WHA), China brazenly thwarts a motion for Taiwan's membership. Chinese Health Minister Gao Qiang also raises four principles, intentionally manipulating the illusion of helping to resolve the matter of health cooperation with Taiwan and Taiwan's participation in international health activities within the "one China" framework so as to suppress Taiwan's participation.</p>
June 2006	<p>Beth Krom, mayor of Irvine, California, visits Shanghai in May 2006 and signs a sister city memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Shanghai's Xuhui District. The MOU contains provisions seriously dwarfing Taiwan's sovereignty and recognizing that "there is only one China in the world." The Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Los Angeles actively contacts the Irvine City government and informs it about the deep concern of overseas Taiwanese on this issue. The Irvine City Council subsequently decided</p>

	unanimously on June 27, 2006 to officially abrogate the supplementary MOU signed as part of the sister city relations between Irvine and Xuhui.
July 2006	China politically intervenes to demand that the ROC National Association of Shipping Agencies change its membership name to "Taiwan, China."
July 2006	Chinese diplomatic personnel in Geneva intend to lobby the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) not to accept financial assistance from Taiwan.
August 5, 2006	Influenced by the incentives of financial aid and military wares from China, Chad announces that it decides to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
August 11-18, 2006	The International Society for Horticultural Science (ISHS) intends to change Taiwan's membership name to promote China's ISHS membership bid. At the ISHS Council Meeting on August 11-18, 2006, in Seoul, South Korea, some council members push for China's membership in the ISHS. China uses this opportunity to force the ISHS Council to change Taiwan's name to "Chinese Taipei" or "Chinese Taiwan." In order to protect Taiwan's ISHS membership rights, representatives of the Council of Agriculture and the Taiwan Society for Horticultural Science attending the meeting cautiously respond and actively consult with and lobby members of the ISHS. After repeated negotiations among the ISHS and representatives of China and Taiwan, the ISHS decides to temporarily put aside the membership name change issue.
August 14-18, 2006	Taiwan defends membership name at the 42nd General Assembly of the International Academy of Ceramics: The International Academy of Ceramics (IAC) holds its 42nd General Assembly on August 14-18, 2006, in the capital of Latvia. Before the assembly, China threatens and uses monetary incentives to lure the sponsor organization and the IAC headquarters to demand that Taiwan's registered name in the IAC be changed from "Taiwan" to "Taiwan, China." It also threatens not to host the next biennial meeting if the IAC does not agree to its demands. With assistance from Taiwan's

	<p>representative office in Latvia, the Taiwanese delegation lobbies the IAC Council and academy members before and during the general assembly, solemnly opposing any move by the IAC or the sponsor organization to ignore Taiwan's membership rights by making any changes that undermine the dignity of Taiwan's national moniker. As such, the IAC president supports Taiwan's position.</p>
August 15, 2006	<p>China's acting permanent representative to the United Nations (UN) issues a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan protesting a motion for Taiwan's membership in the UN raised this year by Taiwan's allies. The letter states that Taiwan has been an indivisible part of China's territory since early times and that the Taiwan issue is the internal affair of China.</p>
August 27, 2006	<p>Beijing team forcefully snatches away the ROC's (Taiwan) national flags from people sitting in the audience at the 2006 International Children's Games in Bangkok, Thailand. When Taipei City contestants Chen Yi-rou and Liu Shih-wei ascend the podium to receive their gold medals in the swimming event, the Beijing delegation snatches away the ROC's national flags from the auditorium and the hands of participating personnel of the Taipei City Department of Education. Then they snatch away the ROC's flags draped over Chen and Liu as they are preparing to receive their medals, creating a general uproar.</p>
September 2006	<p>China forcefully obstructs Chinese Petroleum Corporation's promotion of an investment project at a petrochemical complex in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.</p>
September 2006	<p>The International Cooperation and Development Fund (Taiwan ICDF) originally plans to publish an image advertisement in the September 2006 issue of the World Bank quarterly "Perspectives on Development." However, the World Bank demands that the official English name and identity symbol of the fund be changed from "Taiwan ICDF" to "Chinese Taipei ICDF."</p>
September 7, 2006	<p>Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues a press release stating that the previous title of the Taiwan chapter of the</p>

	<p>Lions Clubs International (LCI) is "MD300-Taiwan." However the LCI China chapter has long placed diplomatic pressure on the LCI to demand that Taiwan's membership name be changed to "MD300-China Taiwan." The Taiwan chapter strongly protests and takes legal action at the Federal District Court in Chicago, USA. This is the first time that Taiwan has sued over its name.</p>
Late September 2006	<p>International Association of Horticultural Producers (AIPH) President Doeke Faber explains the background of the forced cancellation of the AIPH annual meeting and the association's principles and position in handling the matter. He states that the meeting has to be canceled because of political factors related to China's demand that the name of the Taiwan Floriculture Development Association be changed and that activities sponsored by Taiwan receive the approval of the China Flower Association.</p>
September 27, 2006	<p>The World Economic Forum (WEF) originally refers to Taiwan as "Taiwan" in its reports. However, at a press conference on the announcement of the WEF's March 2006 "Global Information Technology Report," Ambassador Sha Zukang, China's permanent representative to the United Nations, protests the use of the name "Taiwan" in the "Country" items. In order to avoid dispute, the WEF changes Taiwan's name to "Taiwan, China" in its "Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007," published on September 27, 2006.</p>
October 2006	<p>At the 2nd General Assembly and Conference of the Alliance for Healthy Cities held by the World Health Organization (WHO) in Suzhou, China on October 28, 2006, the representatives of Taipei City and Tainan City are informed by the sponsor organization just before the conference that "All Taiwanese representatives are not allowed to attend the general assembly" because "there are not enough seats." The governments of Taipei City and Tainan City strongly protest this.</p>
November 8, 2006	<p>The Union of International Fairs (UFI) convenes its annual session in Beijing. The Taiwan External Trade Development</p>

	<p>Council (TAITRA) originally plans to send a delegation to attend the meeting. However, the sponsor sends a written reply informing that due to the demands of the host country China, TAITRA must add "China" or "Chinese" to all references to Taiwan or Taipei in the council's name and address. After lodging an ineffective protest, Taiwan withdraws from the meeting.</p>
November 2006	<p>Taiwan is an official member of the International Competition Network (ICN) under the name of "Taiwan." Since China has not drafted a competition law, it is unqualified to be a member in the organization. However, in order to join the ICN in 2007 as an observer, China demands that Taiwan change its membership name.</p>
Late November 2006	<p>Mao Rubo, director of the Environment and Resources Protection Committee of China's National People's Congress (NPC), leads an NPC delegation to visit Taiwan's ally Costa Rica and signs an environmental protection cooperation agreement.</p>
Late November 2006	<p>A delegation from China's National People's Congress visits Taiwan allies Guatemala and Nicaragua and discusses cooperation plans with the civil aviation industries there.</p>
January 2007	<p>China seriously takes up with the United States (US) the matter of President Chen Shui-bian's transit stop in the United States en route to Nicaragua. It even pressures Mexico to disallow President Chen's plane to fly over Mexico's flight information region.</p>
January 2007	<p>China pressures Korea to change the nationality on visas issued to Taiwanese exchange students to "China."</p>
February 2007	<p>According to a report by Japan's Sankei Shimbun, China uses its veto power to block United Nations' peacekeeping efforts in Haiti, thus causing Taiwan's ally Haiti to issue a letter to China stating that it will no longer support Taiwan's bid to join the UN.</p>
March 1-2, 2007	<p>At an international symposium on fisheries subsidies held by the WTO in Geneva, Chinese officials force the wording of all of the symposium documents mentioning Taiwan to be changed to "China, Taiwan Province."</p>

March 2007	Due to China's pressure, BirdLife International requires the Wild Bird Federation Taiwan to change its name for meetings.
March 2007	On January 5, 2007, Taiwan's Legislative Yuan approved a resolution for Taiwan to join the Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Taiwan diplomatic ally Nauru submitted to the United Nations (UN) Secretariat a Taiwan's application letter to be forwarded to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. However, in late March, Secretary-General Ban returns the letter, saying that UN Resolution No. 2758 states that Taiwan is part of the People's Republic of China and does not have membership status in the UN. The UN therefore cannot accept this document.
March 30, 2007	Venezuela cancels the 90-day visa-free treatment originally offered to Taiwanese tourists. Since implementation of the new policy, there have been many instances in which Taiwanese travelers landing at Caracas Airport were refused entry and forced to return on their original flight. (Venezuela President Hugo Chavez has visited China four times to seek nonpermanent member status for Venezuela on the United Nations Security Council)
March 2007 to Present	A section of the website for the Beijing Association of Taiwanese Enterprises (BATE) recruiting volunteers for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games lists the country/area field on the registration form for Taiwanese volunteers as "China Taipei" in Chinese moniker, intentionally downgrading Taiwan's sovereignty. On October 1, 2007, Taiwan's Ministry of Education issued a letter to various universities asking them to advise their students against participating in the volunteer program.
April 2007	On April 11, 2007, President Chen Shui-bian sends an official letter to the new World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General Margaret Chan Fung Fu-chun, in which he mentions Taiwan's proposal to apply for WHO membership under the name of "Taiwan." Director-General Chan clearly states in an interview with the online edition of the U.S. Cable

	<p>News Network (CNN.com) that WHO member countries all firmly stick to the "one China" principle and will handle the Taiwan issue in strict accordance with WHO policy. On April 15, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the WHO is a specialized agency of the United Nations that only sovereign countries may join. Taiwan fundamentally lacks the qualifications to join or apply for membership in the WHO.</p>
April 24, 2007	<p>China refuses to issue a visa to Kaohsiung City Deputy Mayor Cheng Wen-long to lead a delegation to Beijing to attend the annual congress of the General Association of International Sports Federations (GAISF).</p>
April 26, 2007	<p>The International Olympic Committee (IOC) announces that the 2008 Beijing Olympic Torch relay route will go from Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam to Taipei City and then continue on to Hong Kong and Macao before returning to China. Although Hong Kong is a member of the IOC, Hong Kong became "Hong Kong, China"—a part of China in 1997. Moreover, Macao is not a member of the IOC. The proposed route is designed by China to dwarf Taiwan's sovereign status and treat Taipei as the first leg of the "domestic route" of the Torch in the People's Republic of China, while also calling Taiwan "China Taipei" in Chinese moniker.</p>
May 2007	<p>Bowing to pressure from China, the United Nations refuses for the fourth consecutive year to issue press passes for Taiwan reporters to cover news at the World Health Assembly (WHA).</p>
May 3, 2007	<p>Chairman Tang Jinn-chuan of the Fair Trade Commission under the Executive Yuan is invited to attend 4th East Asia Conference on Competition Law and Policy and 3rd Top Level Officials' Meeting on Competition Policy in Hanoi, Vietnam. However, after China pressures Vietnam, Chairman Tang is prevented from attending the two events.</p>
May 14, 2007	<p>At the opening ceremony of the 60th World Health Assembly (WHA), Taiwan's application is thwarted by China's obstruction. China also issues a statement declaring that the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) effective from June 15, 2007, cover the entire territory of China, including</p>

	Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.
May 25, 2007	Under pressure from China, the International Committee of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) passes a resolution by a vote in Paris to enable China to resume the exercise of its rights and obligation and to change Taiwan's original name from "Taipei China" to "Chinese Taipei," and at the same time to reduce Taiwan's original formal membership status to that of a "Non-sovereign Regional Member." (Taiwan joined the OIE as an official member country in 1954 as the "Republic of China [Taiwan]." When China joined the OIE in 1992, Taiwan's membership name was changed to "Taipei China," but China still was not satisfied and refused to pay its membership fees and participate in OIE activities. In order to resolve the dispute, the OIE in 2003 approved a resolution changing the name of Taiwan to the "Separate Disease Prevention Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" based on the WTO model. This was unanimously accepted by all of the members. However, China did not take part in the vote, refused to accept the resolution, and continued to boycott OIE activities).
June 2007	During the planning of the International Competitive Exhibition of Scenography and Theatre Architecture (Prague Quadrennial) in the Czech Republic in early June, China repeatedly pressures the planning committee to demand that the Taiwan pavilion be merged with the China pavilion and that "China" be added to Taiwan's name. The committee refuses the request and China withdraws from the exhibition.
June 7, 2007	Due to intimidation and bribes by China, Costa Rica announces the establishment of diplomatic relations with China and the severing of diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
June 15, 2007	The International Health Regulations (IHR) come into effect. China claims that the regulations also apply to "Taiwan Province."
June 2007	In mid-June, the Venezuelan authorities verbally notify Taiwan's Economic and Cultural Office that preferential visa treatment will not be extended after it expires. (Venezuela President Hugo Chavez has visited China four times to seek nonpermanent member status for Venezuela on the United Nations Security Council)

June 25, 2007	At the 2007 International Children's Games in Reykjavik, Iceland, China pressures the Iceland government into preventing Taiwan from using its national flag. After communications with the Iceland government, Taiwanese medal winners are finally allowed to receive their awards with Taiwan's national flag draped around their shoulders on the medal presentation podium.
July 4, 2007	Taiwan's Sishankeng Dance Troupe visits Israel to participate in a series of exhibition and performance activities at the "22nd International Folk Dancing Festival." During the festival, members of the Chinese delegation snatch Taiwan's national flag from among the flags arrayed on the stage.
July 5, 2007	China seriously negotiates with the U.S. on Taiwan Vice President Annette Lu's transit stop in the U.S. during a visit to Central America. China demands that the U.S. abide by the "one China" policy, the U.S. commitments made in the three Sino-U.S. communiqués, and the pledge to oppose "Taiwan independence." The U.S., it says, should not allow Lu to participate in any activities in the U.S. aimed at dividing China.
July-October 2007	The United Nations (UN) secretary-general and the president of the UN Security Council return all of the letters from Taiwan's president and minister of foreign affairs stating Taiwan's position on its bid to join the UN. During the UN General Assembly, China's representatives and related officials repeatedly declare that Taiwan is not a sovereign country, issue documents and cite UN Resolution No. 2758 to obstruct Taiwan from joining the UN by every conceivable means. China also mobilizes related countries to declare opposition to Taiwan's planned referendum on its UN bid.
Mid-July 2007	A Taiwanese delegation goes to Saskatchewan, Canada, to attend the 2007 International Biology Olympiad. Taiwan's national flag is allowed to fly at the opening ceremony, but a day before the closing ceremony, Taiwan's delegation receives a call from Canadian officials asking that the Taiwanese team not bring its national flag to the closing ceremony and not allow pictures of Taiwan's national flag to

	be distributed during the ceremony. The officials also make clear that the request is due to China's opposition.
July 20, 2007	At the end of March 2007, Examination Yuan President Yao Jia-wen, as a representative of Liberal International, speaks at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council calling for Taiwan's membership in the World Health Organization (WHO). In retaliation, China subsequently forces the UN Economic and Social Council to strip Liberal International of its consultative status in the UN for one year.
July 25, 2007	At the International Rally of the Federation International de Camping et de Caravanning (FICC) in Ireland, China requests FICC membership and the elimination of Taiwan's national moniker and flag at the rally. The FICC does not agree to this and China's membership application is suspended.
August 1, 2007	The official website of the Women's British Open lists the nationality of Taiwan's three contestants as "Taiwan, Province of China."
August 3, 2007	Japan plays the national anthem of the Republic of China at the Asian Men's Basketball Championship, causing China to approach Japan over the matter. The Japanese committee and Asian Basketball Confederation (ABC) later apologize to China.
August 6-10, 2007	In registration materials provided to the Team Leaders' Meeting for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, China refers to Taiwan's Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (CTOC) as "China Taipei" in Chinese moniker and does not arrange a seat for the CTOC according to the model prescribed by the International Olympic Committee. It is corrected after Taiwan objects. Moreover, during Olympics trials in early August, Taiwan's archery team discovers during registration that their team name has been changed to "China Taipei." This is also corrected at Taiwan's request.
August 12, 2007	Taiwan's junior baseball team is scheduled to depart for Venezuela on August 14, 2007 with the aim of attending the 13th World Junior Baseball Championships to be held on August 17, 2007 in Venezuela. However, Taiwan's team was denied visas from Venezuela due to China's political

	influence. The International Baseball Federation (IBAF) subsequently cancels the competition.
August 27, 2007	Under pressure from China, the official website of the Venice Film Festival changes the country name for four Taiwanese films—"Lust, Caution," "Blood Brothers," "Help Me Eros," and "The Most Distant Course"—from "Taiwan" to "Taiwan, China."
August 29, 2007	China's Osaka Consul General Luo Tianguang leads a retinue of officials to meet with Osaka Governor Fusae Ota. He states that because the "World Federation of Taiwanese Associations (WFTA) is opposed to the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention," China forbids Japan from sending any persons or making any calls to the WFTA and from participating in the WFTA in any way.
September 2, 2007	The United Nations (UN) Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal is held in Geneva, Switzerland on September 3-7. When the Taiwanese delegation arrives at the convention to register, it is obstructed by China because "Taiwan is not a UN member."
September 5, 2007	Taiwan originally intends to send former Vice Premier Tsai Ing-wen to attend a ministerial meeting of APEC, but runs into opposition from China. President Chen Shui-bian states that China's suppression of Taiwan does not distinguish between man, woman or animal.
September 10, 2007	China pressures Taiwan on the holding of the 2007 Taiwan-Africa Progressive Partnership Forum. Since many African representatives must transit in Paris on their way to Taiwan, China pressures French airlines through the French government to refuse them from boarding the planes by saying they lack visas to Taiwan. The French side's reason is that it does not recognize the "certificate of consent for landing visa" issued by Taiwan. Non-governmental organizations are also prohibited from going to Taiwan.
September 12, 2007	On September 12, 2007, the World Health Organization (WHO), through its International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN), notifies China that some China-made

	<p>products have been re-exported from Thailand to Taiwan. China waits until September 21 before forwarding this information to Taiwan by fax, seriously delaying the handling of this issue in a timely way and affecting the health rights of the people of Taiwan. Taiwan requests that the WHO in the future directly contact Taiwan's Centers for Disease Control.</p>
Mid-September 2007	<p>When Taiwan's participants attend the 2007 Asian Internal Audit Conference and Seminar held on September 19-22 in Beijing, China not only pressures Taiwan in advance on the participants to be nominated, but it also peremptorily changes the national name of Taiwan's delegation to "China Taiwan" in Chinese moniker on the Chinese version of the conference's official website.</p>
Mid-September 2007	<p>President Chiou I-jen and Vice President Shi Hwei-yow of the Chinese-Taipei Football Association plan to visit Shanghai on September 27, 2007 to attend the Fourth FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) Women's Football Symposium in Shanghai. However, China prevents them from attending the symposium.</p>
September 18 to October 3, 2007	<p>At the opening of the 62nd session of the United Nations General Assembly, "Taiwan's bid to join the United Nations" was included in the agenda of the General Assembly as a supplemental item on September 19. After a closed-door meeting of the UN General Committee and opposition mobilized by China, UN General Assembly President Srgjan Kerim decided to exclude Taiwan's motion in the session agenda due to lack of consensus. On September 21, the 62nd session was convened and 14 diplomatic allies of Taiwan called for the inclusion of Taiwan's UN membership bid in the session agenda. China mobilized its 140 allied member countries to oppose the motion. Again citing lack of consensus, President Kerim decided not to include the motion in the session agenda. During the general discussions of the General Assembly from September 25 to October 3, China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi reiterates the "one China" principle. Moreover, China continues to mobilize its allies and uses diplomatic stratagems to oppose Taiwan's UN</p>

	membership bid.
September 21, 2007	On August 29, 2007, the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (CTOC) and Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) reached a three-point consensus on arrangements for the 2008 Olympic Torch relay route through Taiwan. However, on September 8, 2007 when the CTOC representative left for Beijing for signing the agreements, the BOCOG deliberately raised new conditions. In addition to the original consensus, China demanded that no flags, emblems or songs other than those of the CTOC may be used along the Torch relay route. Taiwan does not accept China's unreasonable demand, resulting in a breakdown of the negotiations. As such, the Olympic Torch will not come to Taiwan.
Late-September 2007	In order to contain Taiwan, China uses the withholding of visas as a bargaining chip to demand that prior to the 2008 presidential election in Taiwan, the U.S. state governments and foreign enterprises take sides between Taiwan and China. If they visit Taiwan, then they don't need to visit China, or at least, they should scale back their itinerary in Taiwan.
October 8, 2007	At the World Cyber Games in Seattle, when Taiwanese contestants step down from the awards podium holding their national flag, they are subjected to verbal insults and physical attacks by members of the Chinese team.
October 2007	The October newsletter of the United Nations Atlas of the Ocean is originally scheduled to report on Taiwan's establishment of the Dongsha Marine National Park on October 4, 2007. However, the information is deleted due to pressure from China.
October 2007	Zheng Guoguang, Director of the China Meteorological Administration, states that the director general of Taiwan's Central Weather Bureau may participate in international meteorological activities as deputy head of China's meteorological delegation. He says it is impossible to allow Taiwan to participate in international meteorological activities under the name of "Taiwan."
October 2007	Jiang Yiman, Executive Vice President of the Red Cross

	<p>Society of China (RCSC), expresses hope that Taiwan's Red Cross Society can send representatives to join the Chinese delegation and jointly attend international meetings of the Red Cross. Since there can be only one Red Cross Society in any one country, only the RCSC is the formal member of the International Red Cross movement.</p>
December 2007	<p>Using Taiwan's lack of membership in the International Civil Aviation Organization, China attempts to open up a new air route west of the median of the Taiwan Strait to make the Taiwan Strait part of its internal waters.</p>
December 2007	<p>Under the International Health Regulations (IHR) published on the World Health Organization (WHO), China unilaterally includes Taiwan's eight ports on the list of qualified ports in its territory.</p>
January 14, 2008	<p>Malawi announces the severing of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Beijing lures Malawi with US\$ 6 billion to coordinate with China to announce its establishment of diplomatic relations with China after the legislative election in Taiwan and during an overseas visit by President Chen Shui-bian, aiming thereby to intentionally humiliate the Taiwanese government and people.</p>
January 14, 2008	<p>Regarding President Chen Shui-bian's transit stopover in the United States, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that China always opposes any form of official exchanges between any country and the Taiwan authorities. China will not allow Taiwan to engage in any form of Taiwan independence activities on US soil.</p>
January 21, 2008	<p>China manipulates the official procedures of the World Health Organization (WHO) Executive Board to unreasonably shut out a motion raised by an ally of Taiwan to include Taiwan and related countries and areas within the scope of the International Health Regulations (IHR).</p>
February 20, 2008	<p>During talks with the Vatican's envoy in Washington D.C., Ye Xiaowen, director of China's State Administration of Religious Affairs states that China and the Vatican are pulling closer towards resuming diplomatic relations. He emphasizes that the two conditions for establishing diplomatic ties are acceptance of the "one China" principle and respecting China</p>

	in its appointment of bishops.
February 26, 2008	Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng and National Security Council Secretary-general Mark Chen are invited to represent Taiwan at the inaugural ceremony for President Lee Myung Bak of South Korea. Under pressure from China (saying that China's special envoy State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan will not attend if the South Korean government allows the Taiwanese delegation to join), they are prevented from attending the ceremony.