MAC Chairman Su Chi:
It Is Too Early to Link Political Talks with Unification
Talks
Wang Min-yi & Ma Wei-min, China Times April 8, 1999 p.14
Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Su Chi stressed that it was too
early to link political talks with unification talks at a time when the two
sides of the Taiwan Straits lack mutual trust and consensus. The Republic of
China (ROC) government does not evade political talks, nor is it afraid of talks
on unification. However, if Beijing forces political talks between the two
sides, the result would be to underline differences and to ignore agreements (qiu
yi cun tong), and will intensify the confrontation between the two sides,
instead of improving cross-strait relations.
The chairman emphasized that the top leader of Taiwan, whose
mandate was given through a direct presidential election, would find it
impossible to execute a mainland policy completely according to his own personal
wishes. President Lee Teng-huis sustained high popularity is partly due to the
support of his mainland policy by the majority of the people in Taiwan. Even
Chen Shui-bian, former Mayor of Taipei of the Democratic Progressive Party, said
he wished to continue the Presidents line of mainland policy. This indicates
that the unified front tactics employed by Mainland authorities to alienate the
people in Taiwan from their leader has resulted from a misjudgment of reality.
The National Unification Council (NUC) of the Presidential Office
will convene a plenary meeting on April 8, where President Lee will deliver an
important speech. As a chief staff member to the NUC, Su gave an exclusive
interview to the China Times on cross-strait relations, mainland policy, and the
forthcoming Koo-Wang meeting in Taipei currently being planned. Dr. Su
elaborated on the governments position in the interview highlighted as follows:
Q. Lee Teng-huis six-point proposal and Jiang Zemins
eight-point proposal overlap on the idea that the highest leaders across the
Straits intend to end the hostility between the two sides. How will Taipei and
Beijing carry out negotiations on this extremely difficult issue?
A. We are not going to negotiate with the Mainland on
ceasing the status of hostility across the Taiwan Straits. We have already
unilaterally ended the General Mobilization Period for the Suppression of the
Communist Rebellion, which indicates that we have actively and unilaterally
ended the cross-strait status of hostility. This is what we strive to achieve.
We wish not to quarrel over how to name the issue. What we want to negotiate is
a peace treaty. However, before moving onto such negotiations, the two sides
must build up mutual confidence and accumulate consensus. Talks on issues
involving the rights and the interests of the peoples across the Straits in
order to reach agreements will be the best approach to build up consensus. The
two sides should not aim too high. It would be most pragmatic to advance step by
step.
Q. One jurisdictively divided China is how the government
describes the present cross-strait situation. Mainland China has recently
suggested one China jurisdictively divided. Does it suggest changes in the
position that the two sides are taking?
A. The Republic of China defines the present cross-strait
relations as one country with two equal political entities, which, in laymens
term, is like two rooms under one roof. This is the most accurate description
of cross-strait reality. Since we treat the other side as an equal political
entity, not an insurgent group, the two sides could engage in trade, investment
and matrimonial relations. Also, under the concept of division by separate
jurisdictions, our government was able to formulate legal framework and
policies on cross-strait exchanges and negotiations.
The concept of division by separate jurisdictions that Mr. Wang
Daohan brought up in his remarks shows a step toward the right direction.
However, he failed to provide more details. We do not know if Mr. Wangs
statement represents Beijings official stance, or reflects Beijings two-handed
strategy of differentiating between the external and internal approaches.
Therefore, Mr. Wangs concept of division by separate jurisdictions still
needs further observation. Moreover, we should refrain from exaggerating its
political implications.
Q. Mr. Wang said plainly that the Mainland considers
political talks across the Straits as unification talks. As the competent
authority on mainland affairs, what is MACs position on this.
A. How can political talks be unification talks? It is too
early to link political talks with unification talks. While there is no mutual
confidence between Taipei and Beijing, it is imperative for the two sides to
establish mutual confidence at the current stage. Haste makes waste. We are
not afraid of political talks or talks over issues of democracy with Beijing. It
is the Mainland that might refuse any talks on issues of democracy. If we plunge
into political talks, there will be no concrete results except that the two
sides make their own respective statements, which might intensify the
cross-strait confrontation. This is to underline differences and ignore
agreements (qiu yi cun tong), and does not help the cross-strait relations.
Q. Democratic unification was the theme set for the Koo-Wang
meeting in Shanghai last year. Will this still be the governments appeal in the
Koo-Wang meeting this year?
A. Democracy being the premise for unification is the
governments unchanged position. Democratic unification is what we accept. In
the process of cross-strait negotiations, we highlight democratic unification
based upon the following concerns. First, only a democratic Mainland China can
assure that agreements signed between the two sides will be faithfully
implemented. Secondly, only a democratic Mainland China can relieve the security
concerns of the Asian Pacific countries. Thirdly, only when the Mainland becomes
democratic can the people in Taiwan support political talks between the two
sides.
Q. News from the mainland indicates that if a provision for
referendum is included in the (ROC) constitutional amendment, or if Taiwan takes
part in the Theater Missile Defense project (of the United States), the mainland
will postpone Mr. Wangs trip to Taiwan. What are your comments?
A. It is very impractical to link all these controversies
to Mr. Wangs visit to Taiwan. If Mr. Wang is sincere in taking this trip, these
issues will become non-issues. If he does not want to do so, any excuse can be
used to abrogate the commitment for a dialogue among high-ranking
representatives of the two sides. Just as the two sides are opening up
constructive talks, the less unnecessary noise, the better.
A visit by Mr. Wang to Taiwan will contribute to the
improvement of the cross-strait relations, a resumption of institutionalized
talks, and more regular exchanges. Now the two sides have agreed that the trip
will be in the autumn, it will be significant for Dr. Koo Chen-fu and Mr. Wang
Daohan to have their annual dialogue. If this chance is lost, it will be
difficult to make rearrangements all over again by the two sides. In his
eight-point proposal, Jiang Zemin also mentioned that it would be helpful for
the two sides to exchange visits. If the other side establishes unnecessary
prerequisites, or brings up preconditions (on Wangs Taiwan visit), this will
not be in line with the principle of Jiangs eight-point proposal, nor will it
be an act of good faith.