GOODWILL AND PROACTIVE EXCHANGE POLICY:
How Taipei Manages the Cross-strait Relations
Chong-Pin Lin
March 26, 2001
The USA, Taiwan, and the PRC: Security and Strategy after the Elections of
2000
The 28th Sino-Japanese Conference on Mainland China
Tokyo, Japan
The Keio Plaza Hotel-Downtown
Last July, US Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited Beijing. He came
away impressed that the leaders had mellowed up regarding the cross-strait
situation, because they told him that they had no intent to use force against
Taiwan, although they reserved the right to do so. I think it was quite a
significant difference in both the tone and content of the message, remarked
Cohen on January 2, 2001 at Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Up to and beyond the time of Cohens trip to Beijing, opinion leaders in
Taiwan visiting there were given the opposite message. The cross-strait
situation is precarious, and bordering on the eruption of a military conflict .
That is what they conveyed to the audience at home upon their return. Some of
them even accused the new administration for not telling the public the truth as
they did.
Why is the discrepancy in perceptions? The short answer, if I may, is
Beijings two-pronged campaign on Taiwan, which began in late June 2000. In
order to elaborate that point and follow up on it, we should step back and look
at the big picture. How does Taipei perceive and manage the cross-strait
relationship? In this context, Sherlock Holms magnifying glass may mislead
while Ansel Adams wide-angle lens seems preferrable.
I. Current Cross-strait Relations: compounded uncertainties
II. Beijings Cross-strait Policy: two-pronged campaign
III. Taipeis Cross-strait Policy: constructive relationship
I. CURRENT CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS: compounded uncertainties
The actual tension that broke out between Beijing and Taipei in the fall of
1999 has hence dissipated at least atmospherically, though some still perceive a
potentially dangerous cross-strait situation. Since the mid-2000, the
cross-strait relationship has evolved into a mixture of four elements: (1)
lingering though less confrontational political stalemate; (2) growing and even
accelerating economic exchanges; (3) rapidly expanding social interactions; and
(4) heightened military competition. Meanwhile, dynamic developments within both
the Mainland and Taiwan have compounded the uncertainties looming across the
Taiwan Strait. A wide range of scenarios on cross-strait relations--from
dramatic improvement to drastic deterioration--has appeared in the realm of
possibility.
On the Mainland, the Beijing leadership is facing multiple domestic
uncertainties. The rebound of GNP growth since January 2000, following a
seven-year slide, seems to promise boundless economic opportunities. On the
other hand, continuously growing social unrest partly caused by rampant
corruptions and partly by the state-owned enterprise overhaul is seriously
threatening the stability of the Communist regime. The 2002 leadership
succession remains far from settled, not to mention recent signs of intensified
political power strife. All we know is this: By 2003, for the first time in the
history of the Chinese Communist Party, a non-Moscow-trained national leader
will emerge. The forthcoming accession to WTO will deepen the momentous
socio-economic changes already set in motion and perhaps even past the point of
no return. The ambitious military modernization signifies greater challenges for
Beijings relations with regional neighbors.
In Taiwan, the completion of a quiet and bloodless revolution unfurled a
full-fledged phase of democracy. Now a minority government is learning to cope
with almost simultaneous outburst of complications in the state and society that
have long roots in the past. Ahead of all of us in Taiwan indeed lie great
challenges and opportunities both internally and externally. Our cross-strait
policy must start from the reality and go forward. One important reality is, of
course, how Beijing deals with us.
II. BEIJINGS CROSS-STRAIT POLICY: two-pronged campaign
Beijings Taiwan policy has been remarkably consistent at the strategic
level. Its basic tenets such as one country two systems, peaceful
unification and non-renunciation of using force against Taiwan have remained
unchanged for more than two decades. At the tactical level, however, Beijing has
periodically adjusted its approaches. Since July 1999, four distinct periods
have marked Beijings tactical operations toward Taiwan.
A. Military Intimidations and Verbal Threats (July 9-September 21, 1999)
After the former Republic of China President Lee Teng-hui remarked that the
special state-to-state relationship best described the status across the
Taiwan Strait on July 9,1999, Beijing reacted strongly with military maneuvers
posturing an invasion of off-shore islands. Such saber-rattling was accompanied
with vitriolic accusations against Lee and ominous warnings to Taiwanese.
B. Verbal Threats (September 21, 1999-March 18, 2000)
A devastating earthquake that struck Taiwan on September 21 notably reduced
Beijings militant behavior across the Strait. Some say the natural tragedy
provided an exit for Beijing as negative international responses to Beijings
military intimidations on Taiwan exceeded Beijings expectation. Others argue
that Beijing did not want to hurt the feelings of Taiwanese compatriots
suffering a horrendous natural disaster. However, Beijings verbal threats
against Taiwanese independence continued during the forthcoming presidential
election. A few days before the event on March 18, 2000, Beijings threats
culminated in Premier Zhu Rongji acting Marlon Brando in Godfather I. Some say
that it helped candidate Chen to become President Chen with a 2.4% margin in
total votes.
C. Passive Observation (March 18-June 20, 2000)
The victory of Chen who had advocated Taiwanese independence apparently
embarrassed Beijing. Instead of launching an immediate war as previously
threatened by its semi-official scholars, Beijing reacted in a low-key and
passive manner. We are watching the deeds and listening to the words of Chen
was Beijings standard statement during a three-month period of extensive
fault-finding reviews and intensive operational planning.
D. Two-Pronged Campaign (June 20, 2000- Present)
Starting on June 20, 2000 when PRC Deputy Premier Qian Qichen went public
with a less restrictive definition of one China, Beijing began a
well-coordinated, full-scaled two-pronged campaign on Taiwan. One soft prong
aims at winning the hearts of Taiwanese people, and one hard prong seeks to
put appropriate(read indirect) pressure on Taipei to accept Beijings
precondition on resumption of cross-strait talks, and eventually Beijings terms
on unification.
The soft prong includes the following elements:
<Softening of rhetoric without concrete change
of behavior( so far);
<Escalated efforts to invite opinion leaders in
Taiwan such as legislators (parliamentarians), former high-ranking officials
(mostly from the now opposition party KMT), elected local officials (some even
belonging to the current ruling party DPP), scholars, and media luminaries;
<Mentioning and partially implementing
preferential treatments for Taiwanese investors on the Mainland; and
<Allowing dramatically increased number of
Mainland visitors to Taiwan since July 2000.
Meanwhile, the hard prong includes the following elements:
<Continuing to conduct military exercises with
no reduction of frequency, size, or degree of sophistication. These exercises
have been held, however away from the sensitive areas of the Taiwan Strait, and
announced by Beijing officially in a low-key manner with selectivity rather
than, as previously practiced, through the notoriously sensationalizing Hong
Kong Media;
<Continuing strangulation of Taipeis
international living-space with a new twist: launching a diplomatic war on
Africa, the bastion of Taipeis full diplomatic recognitions;
<Mobilizing Chinese overseas globally by forming
organizations and staging conferences under the banner of opposing independence
and promoting unification; and
<Escalating Beijings pressure on Washington not
to include Taiwan in the theater missile defense program, and not to transfer
arms to Taiwan. Beijing is linking more than ever the last issue with
Washingtons frequent complaint on Beijings arms proliferation to Pakistan and
the Middle East.
So far, Beijing seems to believe that its two-pronged maneuver is working,
and shows no signs of altering it.
III. TAIPEIS CROSS-STRAIT POLICY: constructive relationship
After the May 20, 2000 inauguration of President Chen Shui-bian, the new
administration has adopted much continuity in its cross-strait policy from the
previous one. A number of principles and practices, however, have received
greater emphasis.
<We seek a structured and constructive
cross-strait relationship. It should be a relationship with regularized
communications and institutionalized interactions. It will be a mutually
beneficial relationship, because a win-win relationship to us is not merely
desirable but also doable.
<We hold no precondition for the resumption of
cross-strait talks. Neither do we demand any preset agenda for cross-strait
consultations. This attitude of ours contrasts distinctly with Beijings
insistence, before cross-strait talks can begin, on our acceptance of the one
China principle as however defined by Beijing.
<We continue to express maximum goodwill. In his
New Year TV address, President Chen said that both sides of the Strait are of
the same family and the two sides should start with the integration of our
economies, trade, and culture to gradually build a new framework of permanent
peace and political integration . This is the newest extension of the basic
tone set in his inauguration speech, in which he pledged, among others, that
during his term, he will not declare independence, or amend the constitution, or
hold a plebiscite. One should appreciate such endeavor of President Chen given
the lack of consensus on these issues within our society, and even within the
ruling party.
<We exercise absolute restraint on avoiding
being seen as provocative. We are cautious not to give even the slightest
impression that our words sound critical to Beijing, or our behavior can be
construed as trouble-making.
<We take a pro-active approach on promoting
socio-economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. In early last June, only the
second weekend into her new job, the Chairwoman of Mainland Affairs Council Dr.
Ing-wen Tsai went to inspect the offshore islands Kimen and Matsu. That launched
the process for policy formulation on the mini-three linkspostal, trade, and
traveling exchangesbetween the offshore islands and the adjacent Mainland
province. As of January 1 this year, initial portions of the policy were
implemented as scheduled. Some other policies governing cross-strait social and
economic exchanges have been under review for possible relaxation in the future.
In this regard, the administration has undertaken a series of mainland policy
initiatives:
<Granting permission to Mainland journalists for
temporary stay in Taiwan effective November 2000;
<Reviewing the major three links between
Taiwan island proper and the Chinese Mainland, taking account of the forthcoming
WTO memberships for both sides across the Taiwan Strait;
<Reviewing the cross-strait investment policies;
<Planning to allow Mainland tourists to visit
Taiwan around mid-2001;
<Building internal consensus, which includes the
establishment of the Presidents Advisory Group on Cross-strait Relations led by
the Nobel-laureate Dr.Yuan Tseh Lee.
Toward the mid-term future, we will seek to establish a framework for the
discussion of political issues, which may cover the so-called the question of a
future one China.
We cannot sacrifice the national security of Taiwan while relaxing our
exchange policy with the Mainland. We strive to be pragmatic and creative in
restructuring our relationship with the Mainland, socially, economically, and
politically.
Across the Taiwan Strait, we look forward to seeing reciprocity of goodwill
in concrete terms from Beijing in the near future. In the long run, we hope that
deepened reforms on the Mainland, not only in the economy but also in the
society and the polity, will usher the beginning of a new age, that of democracy
and freedom for the people thereon, as well as sustained prosperity and peace
across the Taiwan Strait.
Thank you.
Dr. Chong-Pin Lin is the Vice Chairman of the Executive Yuans Mainland
Affairs Council, a ministerial-level agency in the government of the Republic of
China.